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AN ESSAY

Towards Demonſtrating the

IMMATERIALITY,

AND

FREE-AGENCY

OF THE

SOUL.

IN

Anſwer to two Pamphlets; one Intitled, *A Philoſophical Enquiry into the phyſical Spring of Human Actions*, &c. ſuppoſed to have been wrote by Mr. SAMUEL STRUTT.

AND

The other Intitled; *A Philoſophical Enquiry concerning Human Liberty*; ſuppoſed to have been wrote by ANTHONY COLLINS, *Eſq.*

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

PREFACE.

FROM *a Peruſal of ſome of the Writings of the Antient* Greeks *and* Romans, *I found that they had a Notion of, and generally believed in the four fundamental Points of Religion; by which I mean, the Exiſtence of the Human Soul, the Exiſtence of a Supreme and Over-ruling Spirit, the Immortality of the Human Soul, and a future State of Happineſs or Miſery dependent upon our Actions in this Life: And as both theſe People deſpiſed and contemned the* Jews, *and conſequently could have no revealed Religion among them, I from thence concluded, that theſe four fundamental Points might be deduced from the Principles of Reaſon and Philoſophy, without the aſſiſtance of Revelation. Encouraged by this, I turned my Thoughts, ſeveral Years ſince,* *towards trying what I could do in this way; and in reading and thinking upon the Subject, I could not help writing down, from time to time, every good Argument that occurred to me, in order, ſome time or other, to reduce them into a Method and publiſh them for the uſe of Mankind, in caſe they ſhould appear Concluſive.*

As my Method of treating this Subject is a little different from moſt Authors that have wrote upon it, and may therefore appear too ſingular, I ſhould not have ventured to publiſh any thing upon it yet a while, if a Letter, I lately ſaw in the Daily Gazetteer, *had not convinced me, that a Philoſophical Pamphlet ſome time before publiſhed, had done more Miſchief than I could have imagined; and as the Publication of that Letter may give ſeveral Perſons a Curioſity to read the Pamphlet, who can as little guard againſt the bad Effects of it as the Author of that Letter, I thought it was high time, and even incumbent upon me, to enter the Liſts againſt thoſe who endeavour to extirpate from the Minds of Men, the fundamental Principles of natural Religion.*

For this Reaſon I reſolved to pick out ſome Extracts of what I had written upon this Subject, and form them into an Eſſay, by way of Anſwer to this Pamphlet, and to another publiſhed ſeveral Years before, of a no leſs dangerous Nature.

If this my firſt Eſſay proves acceptable to the Publick, I may poſſibly ſoon begin a regular Courſe of Eſſays, for demonſtrating, as far as I am able, the four fundamental Points I have mentioned. But, if I find that my manner of treating the Subject is not agreeable, whatever I may afterwards write upon it for my own Satisfaction, I ſhall forbear troubling the World with any farther Publication.

A Demonſtrative Proof of theſe four chief Points of Religion, from the Principles of Philoſophy and Reaſon, would certainly be of great Benefit to Mankind, and could do no Prejudice to any eſtabliſhed Religion, but ſuch as has in it ſome Doctrines or Tenets inconſiſtent with Reaſon, which no Man will ſay is the Caſe, with Regard to that Religion, we have the Happineſs to have eſtabliſhed amongſt us. For Demonſtration will pre-

vail, where even Divine Authority, without the Interpoſition of Divine Power, may fail of Succeſs; becauſe in tranſmitting Divine Authority from one Man to another, it becomes a Fact that depends upon Teſtimonies, and therefore cannot admit of Demonſtration: Now as we cannot diſtinguiſh between thoſe Divine Authorities that are Real, and thoſe that are pretended, any other way than by our Reaſon, the Misfortune attending an implicit Faith in ſuch Authorities is, that we may have pretended Divine Authorities impoſed upon us for ſuch as are Real, by which means we may be led, nay many are led, into the moſt wild and extravagant Superſtitions or Enthuſiaſms; and this of courſe leads others into a Diſbelief of the moſt fundamental Points of Religion.

Therefore, to prevent Libertiniſm or Atheiſm on one hand, and Superſtition or Enthuſiaſm on the other, it is abſolutely neceſſary to eſtabliſh, as far as poſſible, theſe four fundamental Points of Religion upon the Principles of Reaſon and Philoſophy; and when this is done, I do not know, but that from the

the ſame Principles, our Duty in this Life, both towards God and towards Man, may be pretty clearly and fully aſcertained.

Such an Attempt was never, in any Age or Country, more neceſſary than in this; for Libertiniſm and Atheiſm have of late Years, in ſome meaſure, I may ſay, become faſhionable, among our better ſort of People; and this begins to have that Effect among the Vulgar, which it has always had, and always will have: It begins to lead them into the moſt extravagant Superſtitions and Enthuſiaſms; ſo that there is ſome Reaſon to fear, leſt the People of this Kingdom, ſhould in a little Time return to the antient Superſtitions of the Romiſh *Church, or embrace ſome Enthuſiaſtical Religion, that may, as it has done heretofore, overturn our Eſtabliſhment both in Church and State.*

Againſt both theſe Evils our ſureſt Human Fence is from Philoſophy and Reaſon; and as the great Sir Iſaac Newton *and* Mr. Lock *have, in my Opinion, laid a Foundation, upon which the Principles of natural Religion may be demonſtra-*

tively eſtabliſhed, if I ſhould fail in my Deſign, either for want of Capacity or Leiſure, I hope ſome Perſon that has more Leiſure, and a more happy Genius, will take it up; for it is what every Man, who has a true Regard, either for his Country, or for Mankind, muſt, with me, moſt heartily wiſh and pray for.

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PAGE 51. line 23 24. read Experiments. p. 60. l. 2. 3. r. Retention. p. 61. Marginal Contents, after Succeſs, r. of. p. 94. Dele the laſt Line. p. 66. l. 3. 4. r. Reſiſtance. p. 68. l. 10. r. proceed. p. 74. References at bottom, for b. r. a. for a r. b.

AN ESSAY Towards Demonſtrating the *Immateriality* and *Free-Agency* OF THE *SOUL*, &c.

CHAP. I.

Of the IDEAS *called* EXISTENCE, SPACE, *and* MATTER.

SECTION I.

Reaſon for the Method obſerved.

AS moſt of our Philoſophical, Religious, and Moral Diſputes are occaſion'd by forming wrong Ideas, or giving improper Names to the Ideas we have formed, I ſhall begin with explaining ſome of thoſe abſtract Ideas and Names which are neceſſary to be well underſtood, and fully aſcertained, before any proper and ſatisfactory Anſwer can be given to the two Dangerous Pamphlets I have undertaken to anſwer.

Ideas, how communicated.

Sect. 2. All the Ideas we can receive or form are originally communicated to us by Senſation and Reflection. By Senſation we receive the Ideas of our own Bodies, and the ſeveral Members of our Bodies, and of all external Objects: By Reflection we receive the Ideas of the Qualities and Operations of our own Minds.

Ideas, either natural or artificial.

Sect. 3. All the Ideas we receive, either by Senſation or Reflection, are ſimple, or rather natural, and particular Ideas; ſuch as the natural Ideas of a red Colour, and a round Shape, which I receive by the Sight of a red Roſe; the natural Ideas of Light, of a white Colour, and of a long round Figure, which I receive from the Candle that burns before me; the natural Ideas of a black Colour, of a flaming red Colour, and of a certain Degree of Heat, which I receive from the Fire that burns in my Room, *&c.* From theſe natural and particular Ideas we afterwards form all our compound, abſtract, and comparative or relative Ideas, which therefore may be called our Artificial Ideas.

Progreſs of the Mind in receiving and forming Ideas.

Sect. 4. After having received a great Number of natural Ideas, we firſt begin to form ſome compound Ideas, ſuch as that of our Mother, our Father, *Peter*, *Paul*, *&c.* all which are likewiſe particular Ideas; and after having formed a great Number of ſuch artificial Ideas, we then begin to form abſtract general Ideas, which are either ſimple, that is to ſay, ſuch as are formed from, or rather made up of, but one ſingle natural Idea, as the Idea we call White or Whiteneſs, Red or Redneſs, *&c.* or they are compounded, that is to ſay, ſuch as are formed from, or rather made up of ſeveral natural Ideas united together by themſelves in the Mind only, as the general abſtract Ideas we call Man, Beaſt, Inſect, *&c.* After a Child has received and retained ſeveral natural Ideas communicated by the Sight of its Mother or Nurſe, it begins to form a compound Idea of its Mother or Nurſe, from which time it begins to know her, and to diſtinguiſh her from other Women; and to that compound Idea it ſoon after learns to give the Name, *Mamma.* Then, after it has formed in the ſame Manner, the compound Ideas of its Father, and of ſeveral other Perſons; as likewiſe of the Cat, the Dog, and other Animals, that are often in its View, it begins to abſtract, and to form the abſtract Ideas called Man, Woman, Beaſt, Bird, Inſect, *&c.* For as all our abſtract Ideas are more or leſs general, according to their ſeveral Degrees, *(a)* we naturally begin with forming thoſe that are

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(*a*) Chap. iii. Sect. 9, 10.

leaſt general, from whence we riſe gradually to the forming of thoſe that are more general, and from thence to the moſt general.

The abſtract Idea called *Exiſtence,* how formed.

Sect. 5. Of all abſtract Ideas, the abſtract Idea called *Exiſtence* is the moſt general, and one of the moſt ſimple; for every thing that falls, or can fall under our Obſervation, communicates to us that particular natural Idea called Exiſtence; therefore, we abſtract this natural Idea from all the other natural Ideas that ever accompanied it in to the Mind, and from thence form that moſt general abſtract Idea which we call by the ſame Name, *viz. Exiſtence.* (a)

The abſtract Idea called *Space,* how formed.

Sect. 6. One of our next moſt general Ideas is, That we call *Space,* which is formed from the Idea we call Place, and likewiſe from the Idea we call Diſtance. My own Body, and every Object I ſee or feel, furniſhes me with an Idea which I call Place; and every external Object I ſee or feel, as alſo the Motion of my own Body, furniſhes me with an Idea I call Diſtance. Then I conſider, that if the Object were removed, the Place where it was, and alſo the Diſtance that was between it and my Body, would ſtill remain, or continue to exiſt; therefore every particular Place, and every particular Diſtance, muſt have an Exiſtence, or muſt communicate to me the natural Idea we call Exiſtence: Likewiſe I conſider, that every particular Place, even the ſmalleſt we can imagine, muſt have Length, Breadth, or Depth, (either of which, or any two of which, or all the Three taken together, we call by an abſtract Name, *Extenſion*) as well when the Body or Object is removed, as when it was there; and as, if two Objects at a Diſtance were to meet, or to be brought together, the Diſtance that was between them would then be a continued Series of Places; therefore every Diſtance muſt have Extenſion, or muſt communicate to me the natural Idea we call Length, Breadth, or Depth: And laſtly I conſider, that every Place muſt have a Capacity to contain the Object that is in it, as well after the Object is removed, as when it was there; and likewiſe every Diſtance that is between two Objects, muſt have a Capacity to contain the two, or ſome part of both or of one of them, becauſe the two Objects may meet, or be brought cloſe together; therefore every Place, and every Diſtance, muſt have Capacjouſneſs, or muſt communicate to me the natural Ideal I call by its abſtract Name, Capaciouſneſs, that is to ſay, a Capacity or Power to contain or receive other Sorts of Exiſtences. For this Reaſon I abſtract, or pick out theſe three Ideas, *viz.* Exiſtence,

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(a) Chap. viii. Sect. 2.

Extenſion, and Capaciouſneſs, and uniting them together by themſelves in the Mind, I form that abſtract compounded Idea which we call *Space*. *Space* therefore is an extended Exiſtence, capable of containing or receiving other Sorts of Exiſtences. (*a*)

The abſtract Idea called *Matter*, how formed.

Sect. 7. In ſeveral Parts of Space we find ſomething that reſiſts us, and poſſeſſes that Part of Space where it is, ſo abſolutely, that we cannot get into that Part of Space, till it be removed, by which means it communicates to us the natural Ideas we call Reſiſtance and Impenetrability, together with a great many other natural Ideas, which are not communicated by other Parts of Space; therefore we conclude that there muſt be ſomething, or ſome ſort of Exiſtſtence, in thoſe Parts of Space, different from Space itſelf. After having formed a great many different compound Ideas of thoſe ſeveral Exiſtences which, by their Reſiſtance and Impenetrability, we perceive to be different from Space, we, by abſtracting, leave out of each compound Idea, thoſe Ideas which render it particular, and conſidering thoſe Ideas only, which we find included in every one of them, we unite theſe Ideas by themſelves only in the Mind, and from thence form that General abſtract com-

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(*a*) Chap. iii. Sect. 17, 18. Chap. viii. Sect. 3.

pounded Idea, to which we give the Name *Matter*. Thus I find every particular Object that communicates to me the Idea of Reſiſtance, communicates likewiſe the Ideas of Exiſtence, Extenſion, and Impenetrability; (beſides a great many Ideas peculiar to that particular Object) therefore I abſtract theſe four Ideas, and by uniting them together, by themſelves only, in the Mind, I form that General abſtract compounded Idea, which I call *Matter*. *Matter*, therefore, I may already define to be (tho' I ſhall hereafter add ſome other Terms to its Definition) an extended, reſiſting, impenetrable Exiſtence. (*a*)

CHAP. II.

Of the IDEAS *called* SOMETHING *and* NOTHING.

The Idea called *Something*, how formed.

Sect. 1. WHEN a natural Idea of any kind is communicated to us, we neceſſarily conclude that there muſt be ſome Exiſtence which communicates that Idea to us, and this Exiſtence conſidered abſtractedly from the Idea or Ideas it communicates, we call by the general Name, *Something*.

(*a*) Chap. iii. Sect. 19, 20. Chap. v. Sect. 7. Chap. viii. Sect. 4.

The Idea called *Nothing*, how formed.

Sect. 2. Now as this our General abſtract Idea called *Something*, is formed from ſome natural Idea's being communicated to us, ſo when no natural Idea is communicated to the Mind we form that general abſtract negative Idea which we call *Nothing*.

Meer Space, why called *Nothing*.

Sect. 3. But as Space communicates ſo few Ideas to us, therefore we call Space *Nothing*, tho' it certainly has an Exiſtence as well as thoſe Material Objects that communicate to us the greateſt Number and Variety of natural Ideas; therefore by the Word or Term *Something*, we always mean ſome Exiſtence that communicates to us ſome other Ideas beſides thoſe communicated by meer Space; and by the Word or Term *Nothing*, we mean that from ſuch a Place, or ſuch a Part of Space, no Idea is communicated to us beſides thoſe communicated by Space itſelf.

Air, why by ſome called *Nothing*.

Sect. 4. For the ſame reaſon a Man that has never heard of nor ſeen any Experiment made by the Air-Pump, would ſay, that there is nothing in an empty Room, becauſe he finds no natural Idea communicated to him from any Part within that Room, beſides thoſe communicated by Space itſelf; but if he knows the Experiments uſually made by the Air-Pump, he will conclude that the Room muſt be full of Air, becauſe he finds he can breath and live in it; for by ſeeing ſuch Experiments made he knows, that no Creature can live in a Place where there is no Air.

CHAP. III.

Of the IDEAS *called* SUBSTANCE *and* QUALITY.

The Ideas called *Subſtance* and *Quality*, how formed.

Sect. 1. AGAIN, when any natural Idea is communicated to us beſides thoſe communicated by meer Space, we conſider that there muſt not only be ſomething that communicates that Idea to us, but alſo that it muſt have a Power of communicating to, or exciting in our Minds, ſuch an Idea; and as every Power muſt belong to, or exiſt in ſomething, by conſidering the Power, and the Something in which that Power exiſts, abſtractly the one from the other, we form the two abſtract general Ideas which we call *Subſtance* and *Quality*; the former being a Term for ſignifying any Something, any Exiſtence, that has a Power to excite any Idea in our Minds beſides thoſe communicated by meer Space; and the latter being a Term for ſignifying any Power, by which a natural Idea different from ſrom thoſe communicated by meer Space, is excited in our Minds.

The abſtract Idea called *Subſtance*, cannot be defined.

Sect. 2. This General abſtract Idea which we call *Subſtance*, is an Idea that has given a great deal of unneceſſary Trouble to many idle Metaphyſicians, who have endeavoured, as they have imagined, to illuſtrate and explain it by a Multiplicity of other Words and Terms, which is impoſſible; for as it is only that general Idea we call Something, conſidered with relation to the Idea we call *Quality*, or Power, it is impoſſible to explain it further, or to ſay any thing more about it, than that it is ſomething which has a Quality or Power to excite in our Minds ſome natural Idea that cannot be communicated to us by meer Space.

A particular Subſtance may be deſcribed.

Sect. 3. With regard indeed to any particular Subſtance or ſort of Subſtance, we may explain it by giving an Account of the ſeveral natural Ideas it communicates to the Mind, or the ſeveral Qualities with which it is indued, and by which it communicates thoſe ſeveral Ideas to the Mind. For example, The abſtract Idea or Sort of Subſtance we call *Matter*, may be deſcribed by ſaying, that it is an extended, reſiſting, impenetrable Subſtance, or that it is a Subſtance conſiſting of Length, Breadth, or Thickneſs, every Part of which reſiſts in ſome Degree the Impreſſion we make upon it, and poſſeſſes ſo abſolutely that Part of Space where it is, that no other Part of Matter can enter into that Part of Space, till it be removed. And if we have a Mind to explain any particular Part or Piece of Matter, we may deſcribe it, in ſome meaſure, by giving an Account of thoſe other Qualities it has, or the other natural Ideas it communicates to us, beſides thoſe included in our general abſtract Idea called *Matter*.

Of eſſential and accidental *Qualities*,

Sect. 4. As every particular Subſtance communicates to us a great Number of different Sorts of natural Ideas, therefore every particular Subſtance muſt be indued with a great Number of different Sorts of Qualities; and of theſe Qualities we ſay, ſome are eſſential, and ſome accidental. Now as this Diviſion of Qualities has occaſioned a great deal of Conteſt among Philoſophers and Metaphyſicians, I muſt obſerve, that when we talk of the eſſential and accidental Qualities of any particular Subſtance, or of any particular Sort of Subſtance, we ſometimes have a Regard to the Nature of the Subſtance itſelf, but more often or generally ſpeaking, we have a Regard to our own Ideas only; therefore when we are to determine which are the eſſential, and which the accidental

Qualities of any particular Subſtance, or ſort of Subſtance, we ought carefully to obſerve whether we have at that time a Regard to the Nature of the Subſtance itſelf, or to the compound or abſtract compounded Ideas we have formed.

Of eſſential and accidental *Qualities*, with regard to our own Ideas.

Sect. 5. When we have a Regard to our own Ideas only, the Qualities of any particular Subſtance, in my way of thinking, are eſſential or accidental, according to the compound Idea we have formed of it, and according to the abſtract compounded Idea we have formed of that ſort of Subſtance, under which we rank that particular Subſtance, and with which we at that time compare it; and the Qualities of any particular ſort of Subſtance are eſſential or accidental, only according to the general abſtract compounded Idea we have formed of that ſort of Subſtance, and according to the more general abſtract compounded Idea we have formed of that ſort of Subſtance, under which we rank the particular ſort then under our Conſideration, and with which we at that time compare it.

Examples for illuſtrating the Rules mentioned in the foregoing Section.

Sect. 6. To illuſtrate this by Examples; and firſt with regard to particular Subſtances, of which we form particular compound Ideas, I ſhall take for example the Table I write on, which is a particular

Subſtance of which I form a particular compound Idea; and if I have a mind to determine, from my own Ideas, what are the eſſential and what the accidental Qualities of this Table, I muſt compare it with ſome ſort of Subſtance under which I rank it, and of which I have formed a general abſtract compounded Idea. Suppoſe I have a mind to conſider it only in general as a Piece or Part of Matter, and therefore compare the Idea I have formed of it with the Idea I have formed of that ſort of Subſtance which I have called by the general Name, *Matter:* In this Caſe, the eſſential Qualities of the Table on which I write, are thoſe Qualities or Ideas only which are included in the general abſtract compounded Idea I call *Matter*; all the reſt of the Ideas included in the compound Idea I have formed of my Table, and not in my general Idea of Matter, being accidental: Indeed if I have a mind to conſider my Table as a particular and dictinct Piece of Matter, I muſt add to its eſſential Qualities, the Idea or Quality of its being in a certain Place, or of its belonging to a certain Perſon, or ſome other Idea or Quality that renders it particular and diſtinct from every other Part of Matter; and then that Quality becomes eſſential to the Table on which I write, when conſidered as a particular and diſtinct Piece of Matter, tho' it be only one of its accidental Qualities, when conſidered as a Piece or Part of Matter in general. But ſuppoſe I have a mind to conſider it as a Table, and therefore compare it with that ſort of material Subſtance which I call by the leſs general Name, Table, I muſt then add to the eſſential Qualities of my Table, all thoſe Qualities or Ideas which I have included in my abſtract compounded Idea called Table, beſides thoſe that are included in my abſtract compounded Idea called *Matter*; the reſt only being accidental, ſuch as its being of an oval Form, and of ſuch a certain ſort of Wood. And laſtly, ſuppoſe I have a mind to conſider it as a Mahogany Table, and therefore compare it with that ſort of material Subſtance, which I call by the yet leſs general Name, Mahogany Table, I muſt further add to its eſſential Qualities, thoſe which I have included in my abſtract compounded Idea of that ſort of Wood called Mahogany; the reſt only being accidental, ſuch as its being of an oval Figure, of ſuch a Size, and mark'd with ſuch or ſuch Scratches.

Other Examples.

Sect. 7. With regard to particular Sorts of Subſtances, of which we form general abſtract compounded Ideas, I ſhall take for Example the Subſtance we call Gold. This is a Sort of Subſtance of which we form a general abſtract compounded Idea; and if I have a mind to determine from my own Ideas what are the eſſential, and what the accidental Qualities of this ſort of Subſtance, I muſt compare it with my abſtract Idea of ſome ſort of Subſtance of a more general Degree, under which I rank that ſort of Subſtance I call Gold, and of which I have formed a more general abſtract compounded Idea. Suppoſe I have a mind to conſider it as a Piece of Matter only, and therefore compare it with that ſort of Subſtance called Matter, the eſſential Qualities of Gold are, in that Caſe, only thoſe Qualities or Ideas which I have included in my abſtract compounded Idea called Matter; the reſt being all accidental. But ſuppoſe I have a mind to conſider it as a Metal, and therefore compare it with that ſort of material Subſtance I call Metal, which is a ſort of Subſtance more general than that called Gold, but not ſo general as that called Matter: In this Caſe I muſt add to the eſſential Qualities of Gold, all thoſe Qualities or Ideas which I have included in my abſtract compounded Idea called Metal, ſuch as its being fuſible, malleable, ductile, *&c.* the reſt only being accidental, ſuch as its being of a yellow Colour, diſſolvable in *Aqua Regia*, *&c.*

Different abſtract Ideas the Reaſon why Men diſpute about eſſential and accidental Qualities.

Sect. 8. From hence we may ſee, that when we talk of eſſential or accidental Qualities with Regard to our own Ideas, we muſt determine what are the eſſential and what the accidental Qualities of any particular Subſtance or Object, or of any particular ſort of Subſtance, only from the abſtract compounded Idea with which it is compared; and as different Men form different abſtract compounded Ideas even of the ſame ſort of Subſtance, therefore two Men may differ about the eſſential and accidental Qualities of any particular Subſtance, or of any ſort of Subſtance, and yet both may be in the Right. For Example: If a Man does not include Impenetrability in that abſtract compounded Idea he calls Matter, Impenetrability will with him be no eſſential Quality of any particular material Subſtance, or of any particular ſort of material Subſtance, which he compares with his abſtract compounded Idea called Matter; and if another ſhould include not only Impenetrability, but Motion, in the abſtract compounded Idea he calls Matter, both Impenetrability and Motion would with him be eſſential Qualities of every particular material Subſtance, and of every particular ſort of material Subſtance, which he compares with his Idea called Matter. Theſe two Men muſt therefore differ widely about the eſſential and accidental Qualities of every material Subſtance they talk of, and yet both will be in the Right, according to the abſtract compounded Idea each of them has formed of what he calls Matter.

Rules for forming right abſtract Ideas.

Sect. 9. In this Caſe therefore, a Man's Error does not conſiſt in the Judgment he paſſes, with reſpect to eſſential and accidental Qualities, but in having formed a wrong abſtract Idea; for every abſtract Idea ought to be ſo formed as to render it Diſtinct from all thoſe abſtract Ideas, to which Mankind, or thoſe we converſe with, have given different Names; and no abſtract Idea ought to be ſo formed, as not to include every particular Subſtance or Object, which Mankind, or thoſe we converſe with, have ranked under the ſame general Idea and Name. If one ſhould form an abſtract Idea which he calls Matter, and include in that abſtract Idea, the Ideas of Exiſtence and Extenſion only, it would be a wrong abſtract Idea, becauſe not formed ſo as to render it Diſtinct from that other abſtract Idea to which Mankind have given the Name Space; or if a Man ſhould form an abſtract Idea which he calls Matter, and include in it the Ideas of Exiſtence, Extenſion, Reſiſtance, Impenetrability, and Motion, it would be a wrong abſtract Idea, becauſe it would not include every particular Subſtance or Object, which Mankind have ranked under the ſame general abſtract Idea and Name; for it would include none of thoſe material Objects or Subſtances that are at Reſt, or that do not communicate to us the Idea of Motion.

Other Rules.

Sect. 10. This may ſerve as a general Rule, with regard to the Formation of abſtract Ideas; but as the right Formation of ſuch Ideas, depends not only upon Cuſtom, but upon the Nature of Things, ſo far as we can comprehend it, I muſt obſerve, that as all our abſtract Ideas are more or leſs general in ſeveral regular Degrees, every abſtract compounded Idea ought to have in it ſome Idea that is not to be found in any other abſtract compounded Idea of the ſame Degree; and it ought not to have in it any Idea which is not to be found in the compound Idea of every particular Subſtance or Object, we intend to include under that abſtract compounded Idea. For Example; Our abſtract Idea called Man, ought to have in it ſome Idea that is not to be found in our abſtract Ideas called Beaſt, Bird, or Inſect, otherwiſe it would be an indiſtinct and wrong abſtract Idea; and if we ſhould, in our abſtract Idea called Man, include that Idea of Colour called White, it would be a wrong abſtract Idea, becauſe the Idea called White is not to be found in the compound Idea we form of any one of thoſe Men called *Blacks*. I muſt next obſerve that every abſtract compounded Idea ought to have in it ſome Idea that is not included in the next more general abſtract Idea. For Example; Our abſtract Idea called Man, Beaſt, Bird, or Inſect, ought, each of them, to have in it ſome Idea that is not in our next more general abſtract Idea called Animal. And laſtly, I muſt obſerve, that all our abſtract Ideas of the ſame Degree taken together, ought to include every particular Object or Subſtance that can be included under our next more general abſtract Idea. Thus our abſtract Ideas called Man, Beaſt, Bird, and Inſect, ought to include all thoſe particular Objects or Subſtances that can be included under our next more general abſtract Idea called Animal; for if there were any one Sort of Animals that could neither be called Man, Beaſt, Bird, nor Inſect, we ought to form a new abſtract Idea for that ſort of Animal, and give it a new Name. If theſe Rules were as exactly obſerved, and all our abſtract Names or Terms as properly made uſe of, in other Sciences as they are in the Mathematicks, we ſhould have no Diſputes, every thing would be Demonſtration, but this, I believe, is impoſſible.

When eſſential and accidental Qualities can be predicated of any Subſtance or Sort of Subſtance.

Sect. 11. From what I have ſaid about abſtract Ideas, and about eſſential and accidental Qualities, it is manifeſt, that accidental Qualities can have no relation to, nor be predicated of any particular Subſtance, when conſidered ſimply and by itſelf; nor can they be predicated of any particular Sort of Subſtance, conſidered ſimply in an abſtract Manner. It is only of particular Subſtances, or particular Sorts of Subſtances, that both theſe Qualities can be predicated, when we conſider and compare that particular Subſtance, or that particular Sort of Subſtance, with any abſtract Idea under which it is comprehended. For Example: My abſtract Idea called Gold, when conſidered ſimply in an abſtract Manner, can have no accidental Qualities; for every Idea, or every Quality, that I have united in the Formation of that Idea, muſt be eſſential to it, with me at leaſt; but when I conſider the Idea I call Gold as a Piece or Part of Matter, and therefore compare it with the Idea I call Matter, which is an abſtract Idea, under which my Idea called Gold is comprehended; my Idea called Gold, or that particular Sort of Subſtance which I call Gold, has then both eſſential and accidental Qualities;

lities; for all thoſe Qualities or Ideas which are included in my abſtract Idea called Matter, are eſſential, and the other Qualities or Ideas which are included in my abſtract Idea called Gold, and not included in my abſtract Idea called Matter, are accidental Qualities; and when I conſider the Table on which I write, ſimply, and by itſelf, it can have no accidental Qualities; for all thoſe Qualities or Ideas which I have included in the particular compound Idea I form of this particular Subſtance, muſt, with me at leaſt, be eſſential to it; but when I conſider the Table on which I write as a Table, and therefore compare it with my abſtract Idea called Table, I may then ſay it has both eſſential and accidental Qualities, for its eſſential Qualities are thoſe which I find included in my abſtract Idea called Table, and its accidental Qualities are thoſe which diſtinguiſh it from every other Table.

Of eſſential and accidental Qualities with regard to the Nature of Things.

Sect. 12. Thus we may ſee, that with regard to our own Ideas, thoſe Qualities only of any particular Subſtance, or Sort of Subſtance, can be ſaid to be eſſential, which are neceſſary to be put into the Compoſition of the abſtract Idea with which it is compared, in order to diſtinguiſh that abſtract Idea from every abſtract Idea of the ſame Degree, and from the abſtract Idea of the next ſuperior

Degree; unleſs we have a mind to conſider the particular Subſtance under our Conſideration as a particular and diſtinct Piece or Part of that Sort of Subſtance with which we compare it, and then we muſt add to its eſſential Qualities that of being in a certain Place, or ſome other Idea or Quality that may render it a particular and diſtinct Part of that ſort of Subſtance. But now with regard to the Nature of Things, thoſe Qualities only are eſſential, in my way of thinking, which neceſſarily proceed from and depend upon the Nature of the Subſtance itſelf, as we then conſider it, and thoſe are accidental which do not proceed from the Nature of the Subſtance itſelf, as we then conſider it, but from ſome extraneous Cauſe; and here we are to determine, by comparing the Idea we have formed of the Subſtance, with our Idea of that Quality, which we have then under our Conſideration; for if we cannot ſuppoſe the Subſtance to exiſt, or not to exiſt as that ſort of Subſtance, without ſuppoſing it indued with that Quality, the Quality muſt be eſſential; but if we can ſuppoſe the Subſtance to exiſt, and to exiſt as that ſort of Subſtance, without ſuppoſing it indued with that Quality, the Quality muſt be an accidental Quality only of that Subſtance, or of that Sort of Subſtance.

Sect. 13. For Example: The Quality we call Impenetrability is an eſſential Quality of that ſort of Subſtance we call Matter, becauſe, upon comparing them together, we find we cannot ſuppoſe that Subſtance to exiſt, at leaſt we cannot ſuppoſe it to exiſt as that ſort of Subſtance we call Matter, without ſuppoſing it indued with that Quality; for if we ſuppoſe it devoid of Impenetrability, it muſt ceaſe to be that ſort of Subſtance we call Matter; and upon Examination we ſhall find that we muſt draw the ſame Concluſion, with regard to Extenſion and Diviſibility. On the other Hand the Quality called Motion, muſt be an accidental Quality of Matter, becauſe, upon comparing them together, we find we may ſuppoſe that Subſtance to exiſt, and to exiſt as that ſort of Subſtance, without ſuppoſing it indued with that Quality; for if we ſhould ſuppoſe Matter, or ſome Part of Matter, at abſolute Reſt, it would, notwithſtanding, continue to be that ſort of Subſtance we call Matter.

Examples for illuſtrating the Rules mentioned in the foregoing Section.

Sect. 14. In the ſame Manner we may find that a bright yellow Colour, a great Degree of Weight and Ductility, *&c.* are eſſential Qualities of Gold; becauſe, upon

Other Examples.

comparing

comparing the Idea we have formed of that ſort of Subſtance we call Gold, with our Idea of any of thoſe Qualities, we find we cannot ſuppoſe the Subſtance to exiſt, or at leaſt not to exiſt as that ſort of Subſtance we call Gold, without ſuppoſing it indued with thoſe Qualities; for if we ſhould ſuppoſe it devoid of any of them, it would ceaſe to be that ſort of Subſtance we call Gold; whereas the Quality of being of a ſquare, oval, or any other particular Form, is a Quality that will appear to be accidental; becauſe we may ſuppoſe any Piece of Gold to be of any Form we pleaſe, without its ceaſing to be that ſort of Subſtance we call Gold.

More Examples.

Sect. 15. But if I have a mind to determine what are the eſſential Qualities of any particular Piece of Gold, conſidered as a particular and diſtinct Piece of Gold, beſides the Qualities eſſential to Gold, that Idea or Quality by which I render it particular and diſtinct, ſuch as its being in ſuch a Place at ſuch a Time, or belonging to ſuch a Perſon, becomes one of its eſſential Qualities, even from the Nature of Things; becauſe I cannot ſuppoſe it to exiſt as a particular and diſtinct Piece of Gold, without ſuppoſing it indued with that Quality by which I have rendered it particular and diſtinct; and if I conſider a particular Piece of Gold as a particular and diſtinct Piece of Matter only, beſides the Qualities eſſential to Matter, the Quality or Idea of its being in ſuch a Place at ſuch a Time, or belonging to ſuch a Perſon, becomes one of its eſſential Qualities, even from the Nature of Things; becauſe I cannot ſuppoſe it to Exiſt as a particular and diſtinct Piece of Matter, without ſuppoſing it indued with that Quality by which I have rendered it particular and diſtinct. From whence we may ſee, that the Queſtion relating to the eſſential and accidental Qualities of Subſtances, even according to the Nature of Things, depends upon the Manner in which we conſider thoſe Subſtances, when we have them under Examination.

Not neceſſary to include all the eſſential Qualities in the compound Idea of any particular Subſtance.

Sect. 16. Having thus ſhewn what in my Opinion may be called eſſential, and what may be called accidental Qualities, both with Regard to our own Ideas, and with Regard to the Nature of Things, I muſt obſerve, that if in the compound Idea I form of any particular Subſtance, I include the Ideas of thoſe Qualities which ought to be included in the abſtract Idea of that Sort of Subſtance under which it is immediately comprehended; and the Idea of that Quality which chiefly diſtinguiſhes it from every particular Subſtance of the ſame ſort, ſuch compound Idea may be ſufficient for common Uſe; though I do not include the Ideas of all thoſe Qualities, which, upon Examination I ſhall find, ought, from the Nature of that particular Subſtance, to be included in my compound Idea of it. If I include in the compound Idea of my Table, the Ideas of all thoſe Qualities that ought to be included in the abſtract Idea called Mohogany Table, and alſo the Idea of that Quality which chiefly diſtinguiſhes it from all other Mahogany Tables, my Idea will be ſufficient for common Uſe, and yet I may upon Examination find, that a great many others ought to be included.

Nor in the abſtract Idea of any ſort of Subſtance.

Sect. 17. And with Regard to our abſtract compounded Ideas, the Caſe is the ſame; for, if in our abſtract compounded Idea of any ſort of Exiſtence or Subſtance, we include the Ideas of ſuch Qualities, as diſtinguiſh it from all the abſtract general Ideas of the ſame Degree, and from the abſtract Idea of the next ſuperior Degree, ſuch abſtract compounded Idea may be ſufficient for common Uſe, though we do not include in its Compoſition the Idea of every Quality, which, upon Reflection and Examination, we ſhall find ought from the Nature of Things to be included in that abſtract compounded Idea. For Example: If in our abſtract Idea of that Exiſtence called Space, we include the Ideas of thoſe Qualities called Exiſtence, Extenſion, and Capaciouſneſs, it may be ſufficient for common Uſe; and yet upon Reflection and Examination we ſhall find, that, according to the Nature of Things, the Idea of that Quality called Infinite muſt be neceſſarily included in our abſtract compounded Idea called Space.

Idea of Infinity how formed.

Sect. 18. In order to ſhew, that the Quality called Infinite, is an eſſential Quality of Space, let us examine into the Nature of the Idea called Infinite, and we ſhall find, that it is a ſort of Negative Idea communicated to us by Reflection only; for when we find we cannot ſo much as ſuppoſe any End, Limits, or Bounds, we ſay the Thing is Infinite; and as we cannot ſo much as ſuppoſe any End, Limits, or Bounds to Space, as it is impoſſible for us to ſuppoſe any Part of Space, however immenſe, but at the ſame Time we muſt ſuppoſe, every Way, a Space beyond that Space, and ſo in *infinitum*; becauſe whatever ſort of Bounds we may in our Imagination ſet to Space, muſt ſtill be Space, either empty or full; therefore the Idea or Quality we call Infinity, muſt neceſſarily be included in, or belong to, the abſtract compounded Idea, or the Exiſtence which we call Space, and conſequently muſt be an eſſential Quality of the Exiſtence we call Space. *(a)* From hence therefore I find, I muſt add to my Definition of Space the Quality called Infinite, and ſay, that it is an extended, infinite, capacious Exiſtence.

Diviſibility an eſſential Quality of Matter.

Sect. 19. In like Manner, if in our abſtract compounded Idea called Matter, we include the Ideas of Exiſtence, Extenſion, Reſiſtance, and Impenetrability, it may be ſufficient for common Uſe; and yet upon Reflection and Examination we ſhall find, that the Idea of that Quality called Diviſibility, muſt neceſſarily be included in that abſtract compounded Idea, which we call Matter; and conſequently that the Quality we call Diviſibility muſt be an eſſential Quality of that Subſtance to which I have given the name Matter.

Our Idea of Diviſibility how formed.

Sect. 20. For ſhewing that Diviſibility is an eſſential Quality of Matter, I muſt obſerve, that when I ſee any external Object ſeparated into Two or more Parts, it communicates to me the natural Idea we call Diviſible, from whence we form the abſtract Idea called Diviſibility, therefore Diviſibility muſt be a Quality of every Thing that can be ſuppoſed to have Diviſible Parts. Now as it is impoſſible to ſuppoſe any Part of Matter, however Minute, but at the ſame Time we may

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(a) Sect. 12.

may ſuppoſe a half, a third, or fourth, *&c.* of that Part in *Infinitum*; and as every Part muſt be ſuppoſed Diviſible, in Theory at leaſt, as well as the whole of which it is a Part, therefore every Part of Matter, and conſequently Matter itſelf, muſt be infinitely Diviſible. From whence it appears, that the Quality called Diviſibility is an eſſential Quality of that Subſtance we call Matter (*a*); and therefore, I muſt add to my definition of Matter, the Quality called Diviſibility, and ſay, that it is an extended, reſiſting, impenetrable, and diviſible Exiſtence or Subſtance.(*b*)

CHAP. IV.

Of MOTION.

Reaſon for conſidering Motion.

Sect. 1. HAVING thus Explained what I mean, by eſſential and accidental Qualities, I ſhall next proceed to enquire a little into the Nature of one of the moſt obvious and remarkable accidental Qualities we find in any material Subſtance, which is that we call Motion; becauſe it is chiefly by Means of a certain Kind of this Quality that we diſcover the Exiſtence of another Subſtance or Being, quite different from that we call Matter.

(*a*) Sect. 12. (*b*) Chap. viii. Sect. 5.

Motion no eſſential Quality of Matter.

Sect. 2. It is not neceſſary for my preſent Purpoſe, to explain how the Idea called Motion is communicated to the Mind. Every Man knows what is meant by the Word or Term Motion; and therefore, without entering into the many curious Remarks that might be made upon the Means by which this Idea is communicated, I ſhall proceed to obſerve, that as there are many Parts of that Subſtance we call Matter, which do not communicate this Idea, therefore it ought not to be included in that abſtract Idea called Matter, and conſequently cannot be an eſſential Quality in any Part of Matter, conſidered only as Matter (*a*). And as upon Reflection and Examination we do not find the Idea called Motion, or the Quality that communicates it, neceſſarily included in the Nature of that Subſtance we call Matter, therefore this Quality, even according to the Nature of the Subſtance cannot be an eſſential Quality; for though, for what we know, there is no Part of Matter at abſolute Reſt, yet we may ſuppoſe ſome part of Matter, for Example, the Centrical Point of the Sun, at abſolute Reſt, or what the Philoſophers call abſolute and truly proper Reſt, which is a Suppoſition

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(*a*) Chap. iii. Sect. 9.

we could not make, if Motion were an eſſential Quality of Matter (*a*).

Motion neceſſary or voluntary.

Sect. 3. Now as I every Day obſerve, that a great many Parts of Matter that were before at Reſt, begin to move or to communicate to me that Idea we call Motion, I conſider how this new and accidental Quality comes to be given to thoſe Parts of Matter; and I find that this Quality is given to all inanimate, external, material Objects, by their being ſtruck or impelled by ſome other material Object in Motion. On the other hand, I find or perceive, that almoſt all the new Motions of my own Body, and of its ſeveral Members, proceed from a Quality or Power, I find myſelf indued with, of moving my Body, and ſeveral of the Members of my Body, whenever I pleaſe, and almoſt which Way I pleaſe; from whence I take occaſion to diſtinguiſh Motion into two Sorts, *viz.* That which is given to ſome Parts of Matter by an Impulſe from other Parts of Matter in Motion, which I call neceſſary Motion; and that which is given to my own Body, or the Members of my Body, by that Power or Quality with which I perceive myſelf indued, which I call Self or Voluntary Motion; which two Terms are promiſcuouſly uſed,

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(*a*) Chap. iii. Sect. 12.

uſed, though properly ſpeaking, we ought to apply the Word or Term, Self-motion, to that Idea only, which is communicated to us by the Motion of our whole Body; for when I move my Head, Hand, or Foot, I cannot properly ſay it is Self-motion: Whereas the Term voluntary Motion, may be applied either to the Motion of the whole Body, or the Motion of any Part of the Body, as often as we perceive or ſuppoſe that the Motion proceeds from that Self-motive Power or Quality, with which every Man, upon Reflection, finds himſelf indued.

Mechanical Motion explained.

Sect. 4. Neceſſary Motion I have ſaid to be, that Sort of Motion which is produced in ſome Parts of Matter by an Impulſe from ſome other Parts of Matter in Motion. Now this Impulſe, with Regard to the Body or Part of Matter Impelling, and the Body or Part of Matter Impelled, is always External; but as the Motions of ſome of the External Parts of a Body proceed from, or are produced by an Impulſe from ſome moving Internal Parts of the ſame Body; therefore we diſtinguiſh Impulſe into that which is External and that which is Internal. Thoſe Motions which are produced by an External Impulſe, we call by the general Name neceſſary; and thoſe which are produced by what we call an Internal Impulſe, we call Mechanical; which may lead ſome People into a Miſtake, by making them imagine, that Mechanical Motions are not neceſſary: Whereas, every Mechanical Motion is as neceſſary as any of thoſe which proceed from what we call an External Impulſe; becauſe that Motion which we call Internal with reſpect to the whole of a Machine, muſt be called External, when conſidered with reſpect to the Part Impelled and the Part Impelling; and as no Part of any Machine does or can begin to move, till it receives an Impulſe from ſome Part of Matter, (Springs and Pendulums not excepted) which Impulſe with reſpect to the Part that begins to move, muſt be called External; as neither the Machine nor any Part of it, is indued with a Self-motive Power or Quality, therefore every Mechanical Motion muſt be a Motion of that Sort which we call neceſſary.

The Idea of of voluntary Motion communicated only by Reflection.

Sect. 5. My Idea of Self or Voluntary Motion, being of great Conſequence in my Search after the true Nature of Things, therefore it is abſolutely neceſſary to form a clear and diſtinct Idea of what we call voluntary Motion; for which Reaſon, and in order to determine, whether or no it be a Motion that is originally produced in any

Part or Parts of my Body, without the aſſiſtance of an Impulſe from any Part of Matter, I ſay, for this End, I try to walk from one End of the Room to the other, or to move my Right or Left Hand, my Thumb or little Finger, whereupon I clearly perceive, by Reflection upon what I feel within myſelf, that I have a Power to move my Body when and as often as I pleaſe from one End of the Room to the other, or to move either my right or left Hand, my Thumb, or little Finger; or finally to move neither of them juſt as I pleaſe. This Power, I ſay, I plainly perceive, I am as much convinced that I feel or perceive it, as I can be convinced that I feel Pain when I put my Finger into the Fire; therefore with reſpect to myſelf, I muſt grant that I am indued with a Quality or Power of ſelf or voluntary Motion. This, as to myſelf, I muſt grant; but I can no more demonſtrate to another Man, that I perceive in myſelf ſuch a Power or Quality, than I can demonſtrate to him, that I feel Pain when my Finger is in the Fire, or that I ſee *St. Paul's* Church at Noon-day, when my Eyes are open, and the Church full in my View. For his Knowledge or Perception of this Power or Quality, therefore, I muſt refer him entirely to what he feels or perceives within himſelf;

and if he ſhould take it into his Head to deny, that upon Reflection he feels or perceives ſuch a Quality or Power within himſelf, I ſhould no more undertake to convince him of it, or rather to make him acknowledge it, than I would undertake to convince him, or to make him acknowledge that he feels Pain when his Finger is in the Fire, or that he ſees St. *Paul's* Church at Noon-day, when his Eyes are open, and the Church full in his View. The Attempt would be ridiculous in the one Caſe as well as the other.

CHAP. V.

Of SPIRIT, *and the Methods by which we arrive at the Knowledge of its Exiſtence.*

Sect. 1. AFTER having, as mentioned in the foregoing Chapter, convinced myſelf, that I am indued with a Self-motive Power or Quality, I conſider that every Power or Quality muſt Exiſt in or belong to ſome Subſtance or Being, therefore this Quality muſt Exiſt in my Body, or proceed from the Modification of the Parts of my Body, or it muſt not; which of Courſe leads me to conſider whether this Quality

Queſtion ſtated, as to the ſelf-motive Power or Quality.

Part or Parts of my Body, without the aſſiſtance of an Impulſe from any Part of Matter, I ſay, for this End, I try to walk from one End of the Room to the other, or to move my Right or Left Hand, my Thumb or little Finger, whereupon I clearly perceive, by Reflection upon what I feel within myſelf, that I have a Power to move my Body when and as often as I pleaſe from one End of the Room to the other, or to move either my right or left Hand, my Thumb, or little Finger; or finally to move neither of them juſt as I pleaſe. This Power, I ſay, I plainly perceive, I am as much convinced that I feel or perceive it, as I can be convinced that I feel Pain when I put my Finger into the Fire; therefore with reſpect to myſelf, I muſt grant that I am indued with a Quality or Power of ſelf or voluntary Motion. This, as to myſelf, I muſt grant; but I can no more demonſtrate to another Man, that I perceive in myſelf ſuch a Power or Quality, than I can demonſtrate to him, that I feel Pain when my Finger is in the Fire, or that I ſee *St. Paul*'s Church at Noon-day, when my Eyes are open, and the Church full in my View. For his Knowledge or Perception of this Power or Quality, therefore, I muſt refer him entirely to what he feels or perceives within himſelf;

and if he ſhould take it into his Head to deny, that upon Reflection he feels or perceives ſuch a Quality or Power within himſelf, I ſhould no more undertake to convince him of it, or rather to make him acknowledge it, than I would undertake to convince him, or to make him acknowledge that he feels Pain when his Finger is in the Fire, or that he ſees St. *Paul's* Church at Noon-day, when his Eyes are open, and the Church full in his View. The Attempt would be ridiculous in the one Caſe as well as the other.

CHAP. V.

Of SPIRIT, *and the Methods by which we arrive at the Knowledge of its Exiſtence.*

Queſtion ſtated, as to the ſelf-motive Power or Quality.

Sect. I. AFTER having, as mentioned in the foregoing Chapter, convinced myſelf, that I am indued with a Self-motive Power or Quality, I conſider that every Power or Quality muſt Exiſt in or belong to ſome Subſtance or Being, therefore this Quality muſt Exiſt in my Body, or proceed from the Modification of the Parts of my Body, or it muſt not; which of Courſe leads me to conſider whether this

Quality can Exiſt in Matter, or proceed from any Modification of the Parts of any material Subſtance.

It cannot be a Quality of any material Atom or rude Maſs.

Sect. 2. That the Quality which we call a Self-motive Power, does not, nor can Exiſt in any rude Maſs or Atom, (which is only a Minute rude Maſs) of Matter, I am upon the very firſt Reflection convinced; for from our Idea of Matter every Man muſt conclude, that no rude Maſs or Atom of Matter can of itſelf begin to move, or to move in any new Direction. Therefore, if this Self-motive Power be a Quality that Exiſts in my Body, it muſt be the reſult of, or proceed from a certain Modification of the Parts of which my Body is compoſed.

Nor can it proceed from Mechaniſm.

Sect. 3. From Anatomy I know, that my Body is a Machine, or a modified Piece of Matter, conſiſting of ſeveral different and heterogeneous Parts; and that every new Motion of my Foot, Hand or Finger, or any other Member of my Body, is produced or impelled, and directed, by thoſe Parts of of my Corporeal Machine, which we call Nerves, Muſcles, *&c.* But then I know that thoſe Nerves and Muſcles, before they begin to move, or before they begin to move in any Direction different from the immediate Preceeding, which they muſt do, in order to produce this new Motion, or new Direction, in my Foot, Hand, or Finger, muſt be put in Motion, or receive a new Direction from ſomething elſe; and if it be from any material Part within me, ſuch as the Blood, or what we call the Animal Spirits, which, by beginning to move, puts my Nerves and Muſcles in Motion, or by beginning to move in a new Direction, gives my Nerves and Muſcles that new Direction, by which the new Direction of my Foot, Hand, or Finger, is produced, then that material Part, be it what it will, muſt have been moved by, or muſt have received that new Direction from, ſome other material Part beginning to move, or beginning to move in a new Direction, within my Body; ſo that at laſt I muſt come to the firſt Atom, or primary conſtituent Part of the Matter, of which my Body is compoſed, which began to move, or which began to move in that particular Direction, and by which my Foot, Hand, or Finger, was by the intermediate material Cauſes, impelled and directed to move as it did.

Therefore it muſt be a Quality of ſome immaterial Subſtance or Being.

Sect. 4. Of this Atom, or primary conſtituent Part of my Body, which firſt begins to move, or which firſt begins to move in a new Direction, I muſt either ſay, that it

moved

moved itſelf, or that it was moved by an imperceptible Impulſe from ſome Part of Matter without my Body, or that it was moved by ſome Subſtance or Being that is not material. That a rude Maſs or Atom of Matter ſhould of itſelf begin to move, or that it ſhould of itſelf begin to move in any new Direction, is what I know I cannot ſuppoſe; therefore I muſt either ſay that it began to move, or to move in that new Direction, by an imperceptible Impulſe from ſome Part of Matter without my Body; or I muſt ſay, that it was moved, or began to be moved in that new Direction, by ſome Subſtance or Being that is not material. If I ſhould ſay, that it began to move, or to move in that new Direction, by an imperceptible Impulſe from ſome Part of Matter without my Body, that Part of Matter muſt have begun to move, or to move in a new Direction, by Means of an Impulſe from ſome other Part of Matter, and ſo *in infinitum*; conſequently every new Motion or Direction of my Foot, Hand, or Finger, muſt depend upon, and proceed from an infinite Chain of Cauſes or Motions, every one of which, as it proceeds from a material Impulſe, muſt be neceſſary; therefore every Motion of my Foot, Hand, or

Finger muſt be Neceſſary and not Voluntary; and conſequently no ſuch Motion could communicate to me the Idea of that ſort of Motion which we call Voluntary or Self-motion, or of that Quality or Power which we call a Self-motive Power, and which every Man ſo evidently feels or perceives himſelf to be indued with. Therefore, I muſt at laſt conclude, that the Atom, or primary conſtituent Part of my Body, which firſt begins to move, or to move in any new Direction, muſt be moved, or moved in that new Direction, by ſome Subſtance or Being that is not material; and conſequently that the Quality which we call the Self-motive Power, is a Quality which does not Exiſt in my Body, nor proceed from any Modification of the Parts of which my Body is compoſed; but that it is a Quality which Exiſts in or belongs to ſome immaterial Subſtance or Being.

From hence we form the Idea called Soul, and the Idea called Spirit.

Sect. 5. Being thus fully convinced, that the Quality I find myſelf indued with, which we call the Self-motive Power, or the Power of voluntary Motion, is a Quality that cannot Exiſt in my Body, or proceed from any Modification of the Parts of which my Body is compoſed; and conſequently that it is a Quality which cannot

Exiſt or Inhere in Matter, however modified or organized; but that it muſt Exiſt or Inhere in ſome Subſtance or Being that is not material; therefore I muſt from this Quality perceive and be convinced, that there is an Immaterial Being or Subſtance, which is indued with a Quality or Power of moving ſome Internal Part, or ſome of the Internal Parts of my Body, perhaps what we call the Animal Spirits, and by their Means, of moving my Body, and ſeveral of the Members thereof, when and which way it pleaſes. Then by abſtracting this Immaterial Being from the Quality by which I perceive it, I form that Idea which I call my Soul; and from thence I afterwards form that abſtract general Idea which we call Spirit.

Our Knowledge of Matter, and of Spirit compared.

Sect. 6. Having ſhewn how we come at the Knowledge of the Exiſtence of that Being which we call Spirit, let us compare this Knowledge with the Knowledge we have of that Subſtance which we call Matter, and we ſhall find that we arrive at both in the ſame way, and that the Knowledge we have of Spirit is as certain as the Knowledge we have of Matter, we know nothing of the Subſtance called Matter, no more than we do of the Subſtance called Spirit;

we neither know, nor can know any Thing of either, but by its Qualities, that is to ſay, by the Ideas it communicates to our Minds; and as to the Method of acquiring or coming at the Knowledge of Spirit, it is the very ſame with that by which we acquire or come at the Knowledge of Matter. By my Senſe of Feeling, I diſcover that Quality of Matter which we call Reſiſtance: This Quality, I know, muſt Exiſt or Inhere in ſomething, and upon comparing this Quality with what we call Space, I find it cannot poſſibly Exiſt or Inhere in that Exiſtence which we call Space; therefore I am convinced, there muſt be in ſome Parts of Space, another ſort of Exiſtence, to which, in a general and abſtract Senſe, I give the Name Matter. Again, by Reflection I diſcover in myſelf that Quality which we call the Self-motive Power, or the Power of voluntary Motion: This Quality I know muſt Exiſt or Inhere in ſome Subſtance or Being, and upon comparing this Quality with what we call Matter, I find it cannot poſſibly Exiſt or Inhere in that Subſtance which we call Matter, however modified or organized, therefore I am convinced, there muſt be another ſort of Subſtance or Being, which, with reſpect to myſelf I call my Soul, and which, in a general and abſtract Senſe, I call Spirit.

The Ideas called Activity and Paſſivity, how formed.

Sect. 7. After I have once formed a Diſtinct Idea of a Subſtance that cannot move itſelf which I call Matter, and of a Subſtance or Being which can give Motion to Matter, or to ſome Parts of it, which I call Spirit, I from thence form thoſe Ideas to which we have given the Names Activity, and Inactivity or Paſſivity; for when Spirit gives Motion, or a new Direction to any Part of Matter, I ſay the former Acts upon the latter, and is therefore Active, whereas the latter is only acted upon, and is therefore in itſelf Inactive or Paſſive. From hence, I form a new Diſtinction or Difference between Matter and Spirit, which is this, that Matter is in its own Nature Paſſive or abſolutely Inactive; that is to ſay, it can never of itſelf begin to move, nor can any Part of Matter act upon another, till the acting Part has been acted upon either mediately or immediately by ſome Spirit. On the other Hand, Spirit is in its own Nature Active, that is to ſay, it has a Power of acting upon, or giving that accidental Quality we call Motion, and ſeveral other accidental Qualities, ſome of which I ſhall hereafter take Notice of (*a*) to Matter, or to ſome Parts of Matter.

Sect. 8. Although Matter be in its own Nature Paſſive, or rather abſolutely Inactive;

(*a*) Chap. 9.

tive; yet after we have once formed the Ideas called Activity and Paſſivity, we apply the Terms Active and Paſſive to many material Subſtances which are not actuated by any particular Spirit of their own; for when any one Piece or Part of Matter, produces an Effect in or upon another Piece or Part of Matter, ſo as to make it communicate to us an Idea, which it did not before communicate, we ſay that Piece of Matter which produces the Effect is active, or acts upon the other, and that Piece of Matter in or upon which the Effect is produced, is, we ſay, Paſſive or acted upon. For Example, when a Ball in Motion ſtrikes againſt another Ball, and makes it begin to move, the impelling Ball we ſay is Active, and the impelled Ball we ſay is Paſſive: When the Fire melts lead, or reduces Wood to Aſhes, we ſay the Fire is Active, and the Lead or Wood Paſſive; but this Action or Activity does not proceed from the Nature of Matter: It proceeds from the Qualities of communication of Motion, Attraction, Coheſion or Repulſion, which I ſhall hereafter ſhew to be only accidental Qualities of Matter, given to it by the continual Influence of Spirit (*a*); and therefore, every Thing we call active in any material Subſtance, muſt proceed originally from Spirit.

Matter abſolutely Inactive or Paſſive.

(*a*) Chap. 9.

Sect.

The Idea called Power how formed.

Sect. 9. This Quality of ſelf or voluntary Motion, which communicates to me the Idea of my Soul or Spirit, is likewiſe properly that which communicates to me the Idea we call Power; from whence I ſay, that my Spirit has the Power to move my Body; and from hence we take occaſion to call every Quality a Power, and to divide the Qualities of all the Subſtances or Beings that fall within our Knowledge, into active and paſſive Powers. The Qualities of Subſtances by which they produce Effects, either upon other Subſtances or upon themſelves, we call active Powers; and the Qualities by which they are capable of having Effects produced in or upon them, we call paſſive Powers. For Example: That Quality in Fire which melts Lead, we call an active Power; and that Quality in Lead, by which it is capable of being melted by Fire, we call a paſſive Power. But, properly ſpeaking, Power, like Activity, does not proceed from or belong to the Nature of Matter. It proceeds always from Spirit, either immediately, or by Means of thoſe accidental Qualities which are given to Matter by Spirit; and therefore Power, when taken in a proper and ſtrict Senſe, cannot be ſaid to be Paſſive.

Sect. 10. Thus if we would but attend cloſely to the Methods by which we arrive at Knowledge, the Exiſtence of an immaterial, powerful, and active Being or Subſtance, is as certain and as demonſtrable as the Exiſtence of a material paſſive Subſtance; and we know juſt as much of the Subſtance of Spirit as we can do of the Subſtance of Matter: That is to ſay, we know thoſe Qualities in each, and none other, by which it communicates Ideas to us; and we know, that the Qualities of Spirit can no more ſubſiſt of themſelves, than the Qualities of Matter: The Qualities of the one as well as of the other muſt all exiſt or inhere in ſome Subſtance or Being. But what generally bewilders and confounds Men in their Enquiries and Reaſonings about Spirit or Soul, is, that they endeavour to form an Idea of it by Senſation; whereas nothing but a material Being or Subſtance can, in the common Courſe of Things, communicate to us any Idea by Senſation: It is by Reflection only, that we can acquire any Idea of Spirit or Soul; and from hence we may plainly perceive, that no Man can properly acquire an Idea of any Spirit or Soul, beſides that which actuates his own Body; but after having once acquired, by Reflection, an Idea of his own Spirit or Soul, and

Our Ideas of other Men's Spirits or Souls how formed.

and from thence formed that general Idea which we call Spirit, diſtinct from that general Idea which we call Matter, from the Motions, Actions, and Words of Men, from the Motions and Actions of other Animals, and from various Effects which he ſees produced by one part of Matter's acting upon another, he concludes, that there muſt be ſeveral other Parts or Syſtems of Matter actuated by a Spirit or Soul, as well as that Part or Syſtem of Matter which he calls his own Body. Nay, as I ſhall preſently ſhew, he muſt conclude that all the Parts of Matter that fall, or can fall under his Obſervation, muſt be actuated by ſome Spirit or other; and that, if it were not for the Influence of Spirit, Matter itſelf would become what we call Nothing *(a)*; that is to ſay, it would communicate no Ideas to us, different from thoſe communicated by meer Space. *(b)*

Difference between what is Incomprehenſible, and what is Impoſſible.

Sect. 11. 'Tis true, no Man can conceive how this immaterial Being which we call Spirit, can actuate or give Motion to any Part of Matter; but tho' I cannot conceive the Manner of its Operations, yet I do not conceive it to be Impoſſible, that an immaterial active Being, ſhould give Motion to a material paſſive Subſtance, or to ſome Parts of

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(*a*) Chap. ix. Sect. 8, *et ſeq.* (*b*) Chap. ii. Sect. 2, 3.

of a material paſſive Subſtance, and by their Means to other Parts of the ſame Sort of Subſtance; whereas I do conceive, and from my Idea of Matter am abſolutely certain, that no rude Maſs, or Atom of Matter, can move itſelf, or of itſelf begin to move, or to move in a new Direction. Now there is a great Difference between not conceiving the Manner how an Effect is produced, and conceiving a Thing to be impoſſible. I do not, nor can conceive the Manner how one part of Matter communicates or transfers the whole, or a Part of its Motion to another Part of Matter, *(a)* but I do not conceive the Thing to be impoſſible; and therefore I eaſily give Credit to the Experiments that daily occur. But from my Idea of Matter I conceive it to be impoſſible, that two different Parts or Atoms of Matter, how minute ſoever, can at the ſame time be in the ſame Place or Part of Space; and therefore no Argument, no Authority, no pretended Experiment (for of ſuch a thing there can be no real Experiment) can make me believe it.

No Idea of Spirit can be communicated by Senſation.

Sect. 12. Having thus ſhewn how we may acquire, by means of that ſelf-motive Power, or Power of voluntary Motion, which by Reflection we find ourſelves indued with, the Idea of our own Soul, and how we may from thence form that general Idea of an immaterial active Subſtance or Being which we call Spirit; and having likewiſe ſhewn how we form a general Idea of that eſſential Quality which diſtinguiſhes the Subſtance called Spirit from the Subſtance called Matter, I mean that Quality which we call Activity, I muſt caution my Readers never to think or expect, that the Idea of Spirit, or the Idea of any one of its Qualities, can be originally and immediately communicated to them by Senſation. They muſt never expect to feel, ſee, hear, ſmell, or taſte a Spirit, nor can the Idea of the ſelf-motive Power, or of any of the other Qualities of Spirit, be communicated to them originally and immediately by any Creature they ſee, nor by any Man they converſe with. But after we have by Reflection formed an Idea of the ſelf-motive Power, or Power of voluntary Motion, and by that means of the Spirit that actuates our own Bodies, when we ſee ſuch Motions in any other Body or Syſtem of Matter, as we, by our Judgment, conclude to be ſelf-Motions, we from thence conclude, that that Body or Syſtem of Matter is actuated by a Soul or Spirit, as well as that Syſtem of Matter which we call our own Body.

(a) Chap. ix. Sect. 2, 3.

Even when we converſe with a Man, the only Ideas communicated immediately to us, are the Ideas of diſtinct and articulate Sounds; but when we find that by theſe Sounds he expreſſes the Sentiments of his Mind, which we can find by our Judgment only, we not only conclude that the Body or Syſtem of Matter that utters theſe Sounds, muſt be actuated by a Soul or Spirit, but we conclude that the Soul or Spirit which actuates that Body muſt be indued with the ſame Qualities we have by Reflection diſcovered our own Souls or Spirits to be indued with. Nay tho' we do not hear a Man ſpeak, or do not underſtand what he ſays, yet from his Actions we may, and do often judge, that the Soul or Spirit which actuates his Body, muſt be indued with all thoſe Qualities with which, by Reflection, we perceive our own Soul or Spirit indued.

What we call Self, a Being compounded of Spirit and Matter.

Sect. 13. I hope I have now ſhewn, that every Man who reflects upon what he feels within himſelf, and upon his Idea of that Subſtance he calls Matter, muſt neceſſarily perceive the Exiſtence of an immaterial active Being, by which that Part or Syſtem of Matter he calls his own Body is actuated; and from thence every Man muſt conclude, that his own Being, or what he calls himſelf, is a compound Being, conſiſting of two different and diſtinct Subſtances or Beings, one of which he muſt conclude to be material and paſſive; and the other he muſt conclude to be immaterial and active. The former of theſe we call our own Body, the latter we call our own Soul. Theſe two Beings, we find by daily Experience, are ſo united together, that they produce various Effects upon one another; but what is the Cement of this Union, or how thoſe Effects are produced, is beyond the Reach of Human Capacity to diſcover.

CHAP. VI.

Of PERCEPTION.

Our Idea of the Perceptive Quality, how formed.

Sect. 1. I Shall next proceed to examine ſome of the other Qualities with which we, by Reflection, find ourſelves indued; and which, upon Examination, we ſhall find to be Qualities that cannot exiſt or inhere in Matter, however modified or organized. Of theſe, the firſt that naturally occurs to our Obſervation, is that which we call the Perceptive Quality. When I ſee a Noſegay, a Tree, a Houſe, or any other external Object, I find they have, all of them, an Effect upon me, by communicating Ideas to my Mind; and that each has a different Effect, by communicating Ideas which are different from thoſe communicated by any of the reſt. From hence, by Reflection, I find that I am indued with a Quality of receiving Ideas from external Objects by means of my Senſes, which Quality I call the Perceptive Quality of Senſation; and as this Quality when I reflect upon it likewiſe communicates to my Mind an Idea of itſelf, I find by Reflection that I am indued with a Quality of receiving Ideas, by means of Reflection, from the Qualities with which I find myſelf indued, which I call the Perceptive Quality of Reflection; and then by abſtracting I form that general Idea which I call Perception, or the Perceptive Quality.

It muſt be a Quality of Spirit, and not of Matter.

Sect. 2. Now as every Quality muſt ultimately exiſt or inhere in ſome Subſtance or Being, I examine whether this Perceptive Quality be a Quality which can exiſt or inhere in the material Part of my compound Being. For this Purpoſe I look upon a Roſe, and I find it communicates to me an Idea which I call a Red Colour. By Experiment in Opticks I know, that the Rays of Light are of different Sorts, and that each Sort communicates to the Mind an Idea of Colour different from that which is communicated by any of the reſt. I likewiſe know, that the Rays of Light enter at the Pupil of the Eye, and paſſing through the aqueous, the chriſtaline, and the vitreous Humours of the Eye, fall or impinge upon the Retina, by which it is to be ſuppoſed there is a new Tremor or Vibration, or ſome ſort of new Motion raiſed in the Retina, and from thence communicated to the Optick Nerve. From this Nerve we may ſuppoſe a new Motion is communicated to the Nerves or Fluids of the Brain, and from them to others, till we come to the laſt Parts of the material Frame, which by this means receive any new Motion; but this is nothing but a new Motion in the laſt Parts, no more than it was in the firſt. I find it would be as ridiculous in me to ſay, that the laſt Parts of my Body or material Frame to which this new Motion was communicated, perceived the Idea of a Red Colour, as it would be in me to ſay, that the aqueous Humour, or any of the other Humours, or the Retina of my Eye, perceived the Idea called a Red Colour; and therefore I muſt conclude that it is the ſpiritual Part of my compound Being that perceives what we call the Idea of a Red Colour: Conſequently I muſt conclude that the Quality we call perceiving a Red Colour, is a Quality that exiſts or inheres in that Subſtance or Being which I call my Soul or Spirit, and not in that Subſtance which I call my Body; and that the ſpiritual Part of my compound Being is indued with a Quality of perceiving that Idea we call a Red Colour, by means of that Tremor, Vibration, or Motion that is communicated to ſeveral Parts of the material Part of my compound Being, by thoſe Rays of Light which enter at the Pupil of my Eye. With reſpect to all our other Senſations, the Caſe upon Examination will be found to be the ſame. An external material Object, or the Effluvia of an external material Object, or the Motion given to the Air by ſuch an Object, may produce a new Motion in ſome of the Parts of my Body, but no new Motion can be called a Perception; and therefore the perceptive Quality of Senſation muſt be a Quality that belongs to, or exiſts and inheres only in that immaterial Subſtance which I call my Spirit or Soul.

Sect. 3. As to the Perceptive Quality of Reflection, it muſt be ſtill more properly a Quality of my Spirit or Soul only; becauſe it does not depend upon or proceed from any Part, or from an Alteration in any of the Parts of my Body. When I reflect upon what I feel within, that Idea which I call the Perceptive Quality is communicated to me: This Idea I find does not depend upon or proceed from an Alteration's being produced in any of the Parts of my

Body; it depends upon and proceeds entirely from my reflecting upon what I feel within myſelf when I receive any Idea by Senſation; and therefore the Quality which we call the Perceptive Quality of Reflection, muſt be a Quality which belongs ſolely to, or exiſts and inheres only in that Part of my compound Being which I call my Soul or Spirit. From whence it is evident, that what we call in general the Perceptive Quality, muſt be a Quality that neither does nor can exiſt or inhere in Matter, however modified or organized.

The Ideas we call Mind and Faculty explained.

Sect. 4. Having thus, I hope clearly, ſhewn, that the Perceptive Quality, or that Quality by which we receive Ideas, either by Senſation or Reflection, muſt be a Quality of the Soul or Spirit only, I ſhall conclude this Chapter with obſerving, that as we have been extremely curious in giving Names to the ſeveral Qualities of our Soul or Spirit, and to the ſeveral Ideas communicated originally by Reflection, we have with regard to Ideas, given the Soul or Spirit itſelf a new Name, *viz.* the Mind; for when any Object communicates to us an Idea, we do not ſay it communicates an Idea to our Soul or Spirit, but to our Mind; ſo that Soul, Spirit, and Mind are different Names applied to the ſame Object, when ſpoke of under different Relations. And I ſhall likewiſe obſerve that for the Qualities or Powers of the Soul or Spirit, we have alſo invented a new and particular Name, *viz.* Faculties; for when we ſpeak of any one of the Qualities of our Soul or Spirit, we generally call it by the Name Faculty; ſo that Quality, Power, and Faculty are three different Names applied to the ſame Idea when ſpoke of under different Relations: When we ſpeak of a Power or Faculty with relation to Subſtance we call it, or ought to call it, a Quality; when we ſpeak of a Quality or Faculty with relation to any Effect it may produce, or that may be produced upon any Object, we call it, or ought to call it, a Power active or paſſive; and when we ſpeak of a Quality or Power with regard to the Mind, we call it, or ought to call it, a Faculty: But as theſe Terms are indiſcriminately made uſe of in Writing as well as Converſation, I have taken, and muſt take the ſame Liberty, when I think it can no way lead my Readers in to a Miſtake.

CHAP. VII.

Of ſeveral of the other FACULTIES *of the* MIND.

The Qualities proceeding from the Perceptive Faculty muſt all be

Sect. 1. IF the Perceptive Faculty be a Quality that cannot exiſt or inhere in that Subſtance we call Matter, or in

Qualities of Spirit only.

in any Part of Matter, however modified or organized: If it be a Quality that can exiſt or inhere only in that Subſtance or Being we call Spirit or Soul, as I have, I hope, demonſtrated; it will then neceſſarily follow, that all thoſe other Faculties we find ourſelves indued with, which depend upon, and proceed from our Perceptive Faculty, muſt be Qualities of the Soul or Spirit only. Therefore, as to all the other Faculties neceſſary for me at preſent to take notice of, I need only ſhew how they depend upon or proceed from the Perceptive Faculty.

Of the Contemplative Faculty.

Sect. 2. After I have received any one or more Ideas, I find I have a Power to keep them in the Mind for ſome time, and attend to them and them only, which we call contemplating; and as I can contemplate no Idea till I have once perceived it, therefore this Faculty which upon Reflection I find myſelf indued with, muſt depend upon or proceed from the Perceptive Faculty, and conſequently muſt be a Quality of my Soul or Spirit only.

Of the Comparative Faculty.

Sect. 3. By Reflection I likewiſe find, that I have a Power or Faculty to ſet any two or more Ideas I have received or formed ſo together in my Mind, as to diſcover whether they be of the ſame ſort, and likewiſe to diſcover ſeveral other Agreements or Diſagreements between them, which Faculty we call Comparing; and as we can compare nothing but the Ideas we have in our Minds, as we can compare no two Objects of any kind whatever, till after we have formed an Idea of each; therefore this Faculty muſt depend upon or proceed from the Perceptive Faculty; and conſequently muſt be a Quality of my Soul or Spirit only.

Of Volition.

Sect. 4. By the ſame Method I find I have not only a Power to contemplate one or more Ideas, or to compare two or more Ideas, but I have likewiſe a Power to chuſe from among all the Ideas I have in my Mind, any one Idea, or any one particular Sort of Ideas, as the Subject of my Contemplation, and to continue that Contemplation, if not interrupted by external or internal Accidents, as long as I pleaſe; and alſo a Power to chuſe from among all the Ideas I have in my Mind, any two or more Ideas, or any two or more Sorts of Ideas, in order to compare them together. This Power we call the Will or the Faculty of Volition, and with regard to the contemplating or comparing Ideas, it muſt certainly depend upon or proceed from the Perceptive Faculty; for we cannot will to contemplate any one Idea, till we have received or formed it, nor can we will to compare any two Ideas, till we have received or formed them. But as this Faculty is exerciſed in moving and acting as well as thought or thinking, I conſider whether I can will or chuſe to make any Motion, or perform any Action before I have received or formed an Idea of that Motion or Action, and I find that tho' I may happen ſometimes to move or act without having received or formed an Idea of that Action or Motion, yet till I have received or formed an Idea of it, I cannot be ſaid to will it, or to chuſe it; and therefore even with regard to Actions, this Faculty muſt be allowed to depend upon or proceed from the Perceptive Faculty; and conſequently muſt be a Quality of my Soul or Spirit only.

Our Knowledge of Spirit more extenſive or more diſtinct than our Knowledge of Matter.

Sect. 5. In the ſame manner we may find, that the Faculties of compounding, abſtracting, retaining or Memory, diſcerning, reaſoning, judging, *&c.* muſt all be Qualities of the Soul or Spirit only. Now as we know nothing of the Subſtance of Matter, no more than we do of the Subſtance of Spirit, as we know nothing of either, but only thoſe Qualities or Powers by means of which they tranſmit or communicate Ideas to us, it will upon Examination appear, that our Knowledge of Spirit is as certain and as extenſive as our Knowledge of

Matter. The Ideas communicated to us by the ſelf-motive, or rather active Quality of our own Spirit or Soul, or by its perceptive contemplative, retentive, or comparative Qualities, *&c.* are as certain as the Ideas communicated to us by the Reſiſtance, Figure, Shape, Colour, *&c.* of any material Being; and we are as certain that the active, perceptive, contemplative, and other Qualities of our Spirit, cannot be Qualities of meer Matter, as we are certain that the Reſiſtance, Figure, Shape, Colour, and other Qualities of any material Subſtance, cannot be Qualities of meer Space. Then as to the Extenſiveneſs of theſe two Sorts of Knowledge, there ſeem to be more Ideas communicated to us by the ſeveral Qualities of Spirit, than by the ſeveral Qualities of Matter; at leaſt we have been much more exact in diſtinguiſhing the Ideas communicated by Spirit, and affixing proper and diſtinct Names to them, than we have been in diſtinguiſhing and affixing proper and diſtinct Names to the Ideas communicated by Matter; for excepting thoſe communicated by our Eyes, we have been very little exact in diſtinguiſhing and giving proper and diſtinct Names to the Ideas communicated by Senſation.

Our Idea called Thinking, how formed.

Sect. 6. I ſhall now obſerve, that after we have received by Reflection, and obſerved or attended to the Ideas of thoſe Qualities called Perception, Contemplation, Retenſion, Comparing, and ſome of the other Qualities of our own Spirit or Soul, and have exerciſed two or more of thoſe Qualities, we form a new Idea of that Exerciſe or Operation of the Mind, which Idea we call Thought or Thinking; for by the Word Thought or Thinking, we always mean the Exerciſe of at leaſt two of the Qualities of our Spirit. For Example: When I look upon a red Roſe in my Right Hand, and perceive the Idea of Colour, I cannot ſay I Think; nay even when I contemplate that Idea, in order to fix it in my Memory, I cannot ſo properly ſay I Think; but when I contemplate that Idea, and compare it with the Idea of Colour communicated to me by another Roſe in my Left-Hand, I may then properly ſay I Think, or that I am Thinking of theſe two Ideas of Colour; and when we ſay we are Thinking of any Motion, Action, or other Object, we ſhall upon Examination generally find, that we are comparing it with the Idea we have received or formed of ſome other Motion, Action, or Object. Now as Thinking is a compound Idea, I do not ſo eaſily and certainly perceive the Repugnancy between my Idea called Thought or Thinking, and my Idea of an Atom or rude Maſs of Matter; but when I reſolve this my compound Idea called Thinking, into its conſtituent natural Ideas, and compare my Idea of that Quality called Perception, which is one of them, with my Idea of Matter, I eaſily and certainly perceive the Repugnancy between the one and the other: That is to ſay, I perceive that it is impoſſible for a meer Atom or rude maſs of Matter, to perceive or to receive an Idea; and if Perception be a Quality that cannot Exiſt or Inhere in an Atom or rude maſs of Matter, I have ſhewn that it is a Quality which cannot reſult or proceed from any Modification or Organization of Matter. (*a*) The Parts of a Machine or modified Piece of Matter, may communicate to one another the Motion they receive; but that can be nothing but Motion in the laſt Parts as well as the firſt, it can never amount to what we call Perception.

Cauſe of the bad Succeſs ſome Philoſophers.

Sect. 7. This is the true Cauſe of the bad Succeſs of thoſe Philoſophers, who have endeavoured to ſhew Men the Repugnancy between their Idea of Matter, and their Idea of Thinking; becauſe they have always endeavoured to make that Repugnancy appear at once, or by what we call Intuition; whereas, if they had begun with ſhewing the Repugnancy between the Idea

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(*a*) Chap. vi. Sect. 2, 3.

of Perception, and the Idea of Matter, it would have been eaſy to have ſhewn, that a Subſtance or Being that cannot Perceive or Receive any one Idea, cannot Think of two or three.

CHAP. VIII.

Our general IDEAS *of* EXISTENCE, SPACE, MATTER, *and* SPIRIT, *re-conſidered.*

Deſign in re-conſidering theſe Ideas.

Sect. 1. I Hope my Readers have now learned how we come to form the general abſtract Ideas of Exiſtence, Space, Matter, and Spirit; but in order to render them as diſtinct as poſſible, I ſhall beg leave to reconſider them in a ſummary Way, and then to examine a little farther into the Nature of what we call Matter and Spirit.

Of the abſtract Idea called Exiſtence.

Sect. 2. Every Thing that falls or can fall within my Obſervation, communicates to me that natural Idea which we call Exiſtence; but this natural Idea is never communicated by itſelf alone: It is always accompanied into the Mind along with ſeveral other natural Ideas; therefore we abſtract it from all the other Ideas that are, or ever were communicated along with it, and conſidering it by itſelf we form that general abſtract Idea which we call Exiſtence. Every Thing therefore that falls or can fall within our Obſervation, even Space itſelf, muſt be, or may be called, an Exiſtence.

Of the Ideas called Place, Diſtance, and Space.

Sect. 3. The Ideas we call Place and Diſtance are communicated to us, or rather formed by us, wherever we are, and by Means of every external Object we can ſee or feel; wherever we are, and whatever external Object we can ſee or feel, muſt be in ſome Place, and there muſt be a Diſtance between ſome of the Members of our Bodies, between the Extremities of each Member, between ſome of the external Objects we ſee or feel, and between the Extremities of each Object. Every particular Idea of Place is an Idea compounded of the Ideas called Exiſtence, Extenſion, and Capaciouſneſs, with a particular Relation to the Object therein contained at the Time or to the Boundaries we ſet to it in our Minds; and every particular Idea of Diſtance is an Idea compounded of the Ideas called Exiſtence, Extenſion, and Capaciouſneſs, with a particular Relation to the two Objects of which it is predicated: The general Idea called Place is an abſtract compounded Idea made up of the Ideas called Exiſtence, Extenſion, and Capaciouſneſs, with a general Relation to the Idea we call

Object, or the Idea we call Boundary; and the general Idea called Diſtance is an abſtract compounded Idea made up of the Ideas called Exiſtence, Extenſion, and Capaciouſneſs, with a general Relation to two Objects: And then by abſtracting farther, and leaving out every ſort of Relation, either General or Particular, we form that general Idea we call Space; which therefore muſt be an abſtract compounded Idea made up of the Ideas called Exiſtence, Extenſion, and Capaciouſneſs, without Relation to any Object or Boundary whatever (*a*). And as my Idea called Space has no Relation to any Boundary, therefore it muſt be Boundleſs or Infinite. From hence we may ſee, that by the Word Space, we muſt always Mean, if we ſpeak properly, an Extended, Capacious, Infinite Exiſtence.

Of the abſtract Idea called Matter.

Sect. 4. The natural Idea called Reſiſtance, is an Idea communicated to us by Means of that Senſation we call the Touch or Feeling; and we find it is communicated from ſome Parts of Space, and not from others; therefore we conclude, that the communicating to us that Idea, cannot be a Quality of Space, but muſt be a Quality of ſomething elſe that Exiſts in that Part of Space, which conſequently muſt be different

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(*a*) Chap. i. Sect. 6. Chap. iii. Sect. 17, 18.

Space, which conſequently muſt be different from Space itſelf. This Idea called Reſiſtance, is never communicated by itſelf alone: It is always accompanied with the Ideas of Exiſtence, Extenſion, and Impenetrability; for every Thing that reſiſts us muſt have an Exiſtence; every Thing that reſiſts us muſt poſſeſs that Part of Space where it is, ſo abſolutely, that no other Part of the ſame ſort of Subſtance can enter into that Part of Space, till it is removed, which Quality we call Impenetrability; and every Thing that poſſeſſes or fills any Part of Space, muſt have length, breadth, or depth, which Quality we call Extenſion. Beſides theſe, our Idea called Reſiſtance is always accompanied with ſeveral other Ideas which diſtinguiſh one reſiſting Object from every other reſiſting Object. Therefore, by abſtracting, we leave out all thoſe particular Ideas which diſtinguiſh one reſiſting Object from another, and by conſidering only our Idea of Reſiſtance, and the other Ideas which always do, and always muſt accompany it into the Mind, *viz.* Exiſtence, Extenſion, and Impenetrability, we form that general abſtract compounded Idea which we call Matter. By the Word Matter therefore we muſt Mean, if we ſpeak properly, an extended, impenetrable, reſiſting Exiſtence; and this Idea we may ſee, is diſtinct from that we call Space, becauſe it has included in its Compoſition, the Ideas of Reſiſtence and Impenetrability, which are not included in the Compoſition of our abſtract Idea called Space: And our Idea called Capaciouſneſs, which is always included in the Compoſition of the abſtract Idea we call Space, is ſo far from being included in the abſtract Idea we call Matter, that it is abſolutely excluded, becauſe of its being abſolutely inconſiſtent with the Idea we call Impenetrability *(a)*.

Matter not Infinite, but Diviſible, *in infinitum.*

Sect. 5. Thus, if we attend to the Nature of our own Ideas, we muſt form diſtinct Ideas of Space and Matter; but to render them ſtill more diſtinct, let us compare them with the Idea called Infinity, and we ſhall find that Space is neceſſarily Infinite, but Matter is not neceſſarily ſo; therefore Infinity muſt be included in our Idea called Space, but not in our Idea called Matter. And again, let us compare them with the Ideas called a Whole and a Part, and with the Idea called Diviſibility. As Space is Infinite, therefore the Idea called Whole cannot be affirmed of the Idea called Space; but as Matter is not neceſſarily Infinite, therefore the Idea called Whole may be af-

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(a) Chap. i. Sect. 7.

firmed of the Idea called Matter. But with Regard to the Idea called a Part, it may be affirmed both of Space and Matter. We may ſay a Part of Space as well as a Part of Matter; and every Part of Space or Matter being conſidered as a Whole muſt have Parts, but with this difference, that the Parts of any Part of Space, however large, cannot be ſuppoſed to be Diviſible, whereas the Parts of any Part or Piece of Matter, how Minute ſoever, muſt be ſuppoſed to be Diviſible, and conſequently Matter muſt be Diviſible *in infinitum* (*a*).

Of Motion.

Sect. 6. After I have thus formed an Idea of Matter diſtinct from Space, I compare it with that Idea I call Motion, which is an Idea communicated to me by my own Body, by ſeveral Members of my Body, and by many external Parts or Pieces of Matter (*b*); but as it is not communicated by every Part of Matter, as ſome Part or Parts of Matter may be ſuppoſed at abſolute Reſt, therefore I conclude that Motion muſt be an accidental and not an eſſential Quality of Matter (*c*). Then by Reflecting upon what I feel within, when I move my Body, or ſome of the Members of my Body, and perceiving that the Motions of my Body, and of ſome of the Members of my Body, pro-

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(*a*) Chap. iii. Sect. 19, 20. (*b*) Chap. iv. (*c*) Chap. iii. Sect. 12.

ceed from a Power or Faculty of moving my Body, and ſome of the Members of my Body, when and which way I will, I from thence take Occaſion to diſtinguiſh between neceſſary Motion or Motion by Impulſe, and Voluntary or Self-motion (*a*). Between the neceſſary and voluntary Motions of my own Body, or of any of the Members of my Body, I can eaſily and immediately diſtinguiſh by perceiving that the latter proceeds from that Power or Faculty I feel myſelf indued with, which we call the Power of voluntary or Self-motion, and that the former do not proceed from that Power or Faculty; but with reſpect to the Motions of external Objects, I cannot immediately diſtinguiſh, becauſe my Idea of that Power or Faculty we call the Power of Voluntary or Self-motion, is an Idea that cannot be communicated to me immediately by any external Object, or by any Senſation: It is communicated only by Reflection upon what I feel within, when I move my Body, or any Member of my Body; but having once received the Idea of this Power or Faculty by Reflection, I conſider the Motions of external Objects, and by my Judgment determine, whether they be neceſſary or voluntary Motions, and if by my Judg-

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(*a*) Chap. iv.

ment I determine that they are Voluntary, I from thence conclude, that the Object that makes ſuch Motions, is indued with ſuch a Power or Faculty as I feel within myſelf. But in this we may be miſtaken; for there are many Mechanical or neceſſary Motions which an ignorant Perſon would take to be Voluntary; and this is the Reaſon that ſome ignorant Perſons upon their firſt ſeeing a Puppet-ſhow, ſuppoſe the Puppets to be real Men and Women. For the ſame Reaſon a Man may affect Convulſion Fits, and may ſo well Imitate thoſe neceſſary Motions that are cauſed by ſuch Fits, that every Man who ſees him ſhall conclude, that he is in real Convulſions, and that thoſe Motions are all Neceſſary, though he himſelf knows that they are Voluntary.

Sect. 7. Our Idea of Self or Voluntary-Motion can therefore be properly and immediately communicated to the Mind, by the Motions of our own Body, or of its ſeveral Members only. But by theſe Motions our Idea of that Quality or Power, which we call the Power of Self or Voluntary-motion, is upon Reflection as diſtinctly communicated to, and as ſtrongly impreſſed upon the Mind, as the Idea of any Quality which we receive by Senſation; and by conſidering our Idea of Matter in the Me- Of Spirit.

thod I have done (*a*), we find that this Quality or Power of Self or Voluntary-motion, is a Quality or Power that cannot poſſibly Exiſt or Inhere in any Subſtance meerly Material; therefore we conclude that there muſt be another Subſtance or Being to which this Power or Quality belongs, and this Subſtance or Being, we call Spirit. Spirit therefore muſt be an Immaterial Subſtance or Being which has a Quality or Power of giving Motion to Matter, and of moving ſome Parts of Matter when it will, and which way it will.

Matter Paſſive, Spirit Active.

Sect. 8. From hence we form our Ideas of Activity and Inactivity or Paſſivity, and by comparing our Idea called Matter with theſe two Ideas, we diſcover a new eſſential Quality in Matter, which is that of abſolute Inactivity: That is to ſay, we by this Compariſon find, that no Part of Matter is of itſelf Active, or can of itſelf begin to Act upon any other Part of Matter: Whereas one of the firſt we diſcover, and one of the moſt eſſential Qualities of Spirit, is that of its being in itſelf Active, or capable of itſelf to begin to Act upon ſome Part or Parts of Matter.

Sect. 9. Thus every Man that conſiders will diſcover, that there muſt neceſſarily be in

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(*a*) Chap. v.

in Nature two Principles or Subſtances, one of which is in itſelf active, and the other abſolutely inactive or paſſive: One capable of itſelf to act, or to begin to act, or to begin to act in a different Manner from what it did; and the other abſolutely incapable of itſelf to act, or to begin to act, or to begin to act in any new Manner, but capable of being acted upon by the other. The Former of theſe is what we call Spirit, and the Latter is that Subſtance we call Matter. Of theſe two the whole of what we call Nature is compoſed; and in the next Chapter I ſhall ſhew, that all that beautiful Variety we obſerve in Nature, does not proceed from any Variety in the Nature of that Subſtance we call Matter, but from the different Manner in which the different Parts of it are acted upon by Spirit, and by that means made to act upon one another.

An Active and a Paſſive Principle or Subſtance in Nature.

Sect. 10. Having now formed proper abſtract Ideas of the Subſtance called Matter, and of the Subſtance or Being called Spirit, every one muſt ſee that theſe two Ideas are as diſtinct as any two Ideas can poſſibly be, and that therefore it is at leaſt as ridiculous to talk of a material Spirit or Soul, except in a figurative Senſe, as it would be to talk of material Space. Some Parts of Space may be poſſeſſed or filled by Matter, and ſome Parts of Matter may be

Our Ideas of Matter and Spirit, as diſtinct as any two Ideas can be.

actuated or acted upon by Spirit; but our Idea of Spirit is as diſtinct from our Idea of Matter, as our Idea of Matter is diſtinct from our Idea of Space. Indeed, if it were poſſible, it may be ſaid to be more diſtinct; for there are two eſſential Qualities, *viz.* that of Exiſtence and Extenſion, that are common to Space and Matter; but except that of Exiſtence only there is no Quality common to Matter and Spirit. On the contrary every other Quality that can be affirmed of the one, muſt be denied of the other. That of Extenſion muſt be denied of Spirit; for every thing that has Length, Breadth, or Thickneſs muſt be either Space or Matter, and as Activity cannot be a Quality of Space or of any Subſtance meerly Material (*a*), therefore that Subſtance which has the Quality of Activity belonging to it, cannot have that of Extenſion, conſequently Spirit can neither have Length, Breadth, nor Thickneſs, that is to ſay, it cannot have the Quality we call Extenſion, or in other Words, the Idea we call Extenſion, is an Idea that cannot be included in the abſtract compounded Idea we call Spirit. For the ſame Reaſon, neither the Idea we call Impenetrability, nor the Idea we call Diviſibility, can be included in our abſtract compounded Idea

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(*a*) Chap. v. Sect. 7, 8.

called Spirit; we cannot properly ſay that a Spirit fills or poſſeſſes any Part of Space; we can only ſay, that it actuates ſome material Syſtem, or ſome Body, or that it acts upon Matter in ſuch a Place, or ſuch a Part of Space: Nor can we ſay that Spirit is Diviſible; becauſe we cannot properly ſay, the Whole, the Half, the Quarter, or any other Part of a Spirit; for when we ſay with all our Soul, or with all our Spirit, we talk in a figurative Senſe, by making uſe of the Word Soul or Spirit, inſtead of the Word Power, Will, or Inclination. And on the other Hand, that Quality which we call the Power of Self or Voluntary-motion, or more properly Activity, is a Quality which, upon Examination, we find, cannot be affirmed of Matter; for we clearly perceive that no Part of Matter can move itſelf, or begin to act upon any other Part of Matter, till it has been firſt acted upon, either mediately or immediately, by ſome Soul or Spirit (*a*). With Regard to that Quality which we call the perceptive Quality or Faculty, and all the other Faculties of the Mind, which depend upon the perceptive Quality, we muſt grant the ſame; we muſt grant that they cannot belong to or inhere in any Subſtance meerly

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(*a*) Chap. 4, 5.

Material, nor proceed from any ſort of Mechaniſm or Organization (*a*).

CHAP. IX.

The Variety obſerv'd in NATURE, *how to be accounted for.*

The four chief accidental Qualities of Matter.

Sect. 1. WHAT I have already ſaid, I think ſufficiently demonſtrates the Immateriality of the Soul; but that the Difference between Matter and Spirit may ſtill more manifeſtly appear, and in Order to ſhew that all that beautiful Variety we obſerve in Nature, does not proceed from any Variety in the Nature of that Subſtance called Matter, but from the different Manner in which the different Parts of it are acted upon by Spirit, and by that Means made to act upon one another, I ſhall briefly conſider, the four Principal accidental Qualities with which we find all Parts of Matter more or leſs indued, *viz.* Communication of Motion, Coheſion, Attraction, and Repulſion.

The firſt of theſe, *viz.* The Quality of communicating Motion explained.

Sect. 2. Motion I have already ſhewn to be an accidental Quality given to ſome Parts of Matter, either mediately or immediately, by Spirit; (*b*) and it is a Quality we not on-

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(*b*) Chap. 6. 7. (*a*) Chap. iv. Sect. 2.

ly find the ſeveral Parts of Matter more or leſs capable of receiving, but alſo we find, that after any Part of Matter has received this Quality, it is capable, in a greater or leſſer Degree, of communicating, or rather transferring this Quality to other Parts of Matter. When a Ball, moving with any given Quantity of Motion, ſtrikes againſt another at reſt, we find by Experience, that it communicates, or rather transfers, the whole or a Part of its Motion to the other, and that the Ball which was before at reſt, begins to move with a certain Quantity of Motion, even though that Ball which communicated the Motion, ſhould ceaſe to move, or ſhould move a different Way. This, I ſay, we find by Experience to be true, and the Laws or Rules by which Motion is communicated or transferred from one Part of Matter to another we find to be Certain, Conſtant, and Regular; but how to account for it from the Nature, or from any of the eſſential Qualities of Matter is impoſſible.

And ſhewn to be an accidental Quality, proceeding from the Influence of Spirit.

Sect. 3. When a Ball in Motion ſtrikes againſt another at reſt, we would from the natural Paſſivity of Matter conclude, that the moving Ball would either turn the other out of its Way, or that it would go on puſhing the other before it, in the ſame Line of direction which it had before the Impulſe;

and we would certainly conclude, that if any Perſon ſnatch'd up the moving or impelling Ball, the other would immediately ceaſe moving. We never could imagine, nor could we ſuppoſe from our Idea of Matter, or from any of the eſſential Qualities of Matter, that the impelling Ball had by the Impulſe communicated or transferred a Part of its Motion to the Ball impelled, by Means of which the impelled Ball would, even after the other's being taken up, go on in the ſame Line of Direction, and with ſuch a Quantity of Motion as it had, by the Impulſe, received from the impelling Ball. This, I ſay, we could not from the Nature, or from any of the eſſential Qualities of Matter ſuppoſe; and therefore from the Nature of Things this Quality called Communication or transferring of Motion, can be no eſſential Quality of the Subſtance called Matter. I ſay, this Quality called Communication or transferring of Motion, can be no eſſential Quality of the Subſtance called Matter, not only becauſe, upon comparing the Idea we have formed of this Subſtance with our Idea of this Quality, we find we can ſuppoſe this ſort of Subſtance to Exiſt, without ſuppoſing it indued with this Quality (*a*); but likewiſe becauſe

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(*a*) Chap. iii. Sect. 12.

we may ſuppoſe the impelled Ball would ceaſe moving, as ſoon as the impelling Ball was taken up, and conſequently no Motion transferred from the one to the other; nay we would actually ſuppoſe it to be ſo, from the Nature of Matter, if Experience did not convince us of the contrary. Therefore this Quality called Communication or transferring of Motion, muſt be an accidental Quality given to Matter by ſome other Being, which muſt be an immaterial active Being, and conſequently ſuch a Being as that to which we have given the Name Spirit. From whence we muſt conclude, that this conſtant and regular Communication or transferring of Motion, which we obſerve in all Parts of Matter that fall within our Obſervation, muſt proceed from the continual Influence of ſome Spiritual Being, who acts upon Matter, and makes one Part of Matter act upon another, according to thoſe Rules or Laws he has been pleaſed to preſcribe; which Rules or Laws we call the Laws of Nature.

The 2d, *viz.* Coheſion explained, and ſhewn to be the ſame.

Sect. 4. Coheſion, or that ſort of Attraction which we call Coheſion, is that Quality by which the Parts of ſome ſorts of Matter cohere, or ſtick ſo ſtrongly together, that it requires a certain Degree of Force, greater or leſſer according to the Degree of

Coheſion, to ſeparate them from one another. This Quality we find, acts upon Contact only, according to the Breadth of the Surfaces of the Cohering Parts, and not according to the Quantities of Matter; and it muſt be an accidental, and not an eſſential Quality of Matter, becauſe all Parts of Matter are not, or not equally, indued with it, and becauſe upon comparing the Idea we have formed of the Subſtance called Matter, with our Idea of the Quality called Coheſion, we find we may ſuppoſe this ſort of Subſtance to Exiſt, without ſuppoſing it indued with this Quality (*a*): Nay from our Idea of this Subſtance, we muſt grant it to be impoſſible, that any two Parts of Matter ſhould of themſelves cohere or ſtick together ſo as to reſiſt the leaſt Force; therefore we muſt conclude, that this Quality is an accidental Quality given to the ſeveral Parts of Matter in different Degrees, by the continual Influence of ſome Spiritual Being that acts upon Matter, and makes the ſeveral Parts of Matter act upon one another, according to thoſe Rules which that Being has been pleaſed to preſcribe, which Rules we likewiſe in this caſe call the Laws of Nature.

The 3d, *viz.* Attraction explained, and ſhewn to be the ſame.

Sect. 5. Attraction properly ſo called, is that Quality by which the Parts of ſome Sorts of

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(*a*) Chap. iii. Sect. 12.

of Matter, even when at ſome Diſtance from each other, draw towards one another. This Quality is found to act according to the Quantity of Matter contained in each attracting Part; and it muſt be an accidental, and not an eſſential Quality of Matter for the ſame Reaſons with the former, *viz.* becauſe all Parts of Matter are not, or not equally indued with it; and becauſe, from our Idea of Matter, we conceive it impoſſible, that any two Parts of Matter ſhould of themſelves move ever ſo little towards one another.

The 4th, *viz.* Repulſion explained, and ſhewn to be the ſame.

Sect. 6. Repulſion again is that Quality, by which the Parts of ſome Sorts of Matter, when placed without the Sphere of each other's Attraction, mutually fly from each other; and this Quality too, muſt be an accidental, and not an eſſential Quality of Matter, for the ſame Reaſons with the former; therefore both the Quality of Attraction, and the Quality of Repulſion, muſt be Qualities which proceed from the continual Influence of ſome Spiritual Being that acts upon Matter, and makes the ſeveral Parts of Matter act upon one another, according to thoſe Rules he has been pleaſed to preſcribe; which Rules we call the Laws of Nature.

Gravitation proceeds from Attraction.

Sect. 7. Before I proceed to take any notice of the Effects produced by theſe accidental Qualities given to Matter by the continual Influence of ſome Spiritual Being, I muſt obſerve, that from the mutual Attraction that is between the Earth and the ſeveral Bodies that ſurround it, or that reſt upon the Surface of it, proceeds that Quality which we call Gravitation, by which all Bodies, according to the Quantity of Matter in each, tend towards the Centre of the Earth, and cannot be prevented, or put out of their way, but by a Force equal or Superior to their Force of Gravitation. This, I ſay, is an Effect produced by one of thoſe Qualities given to Matter by the continual Influence of ſome Spiritual Being, and therefore it is an Effect which does not originally proceed from the Nature of that Subſtance we call Matter, but from ſome Spiritual Being that acts upon Matter, according to Rules or Laws which that Being has either preſcribed to himſelf, or which have been preſcribed to him by ſome Superior Being.

From theſe Qualities Matter becomes what we call Something.

Sect. 8. From theſe accidental Qualities given to Matter by the continual Influence of ſome Spiritual Being, my Readers may ſee, that it would be eaſy to demonſtrate the Exiſtence of a Supreme over-ruling Spirit; but as this is not my Buſineſs at preſent, I ſhall proceed to ſhew that from thoſe accidental Qualities, and conſequently from the Influence of Spirit, or from the Action of

Spirit upon Matter, proceeds originally all that Beautiful Variety which we obſerve in Nature: Nay I ſhall ſhew, that it is from this Influence or Action that Matter itſelf becomes perceivable by us, and conſequently it is from this Influence that it becomes what we call Something.

From hence it becomes capable of communicating to us the Idea of Reſiſtance.

Sect. 9. From the mutual Coheſion that is between the Parts of any material Object, according to the Degree of Coheſion proper to each Sort, proceed thoſe Qualities which communicate to us the Ideas we call Solidity, Hardneſs, Softneſs, and all the other Ideas communicated to us by means of that Senſation we call the Touch or Feeling: Nay it is by means of this mutual Coheſion of the Parts of Matter, and the Quality of Gravitation, or the Quality of Communication of Motion, that the natural Idea we call Reſiſtance is communicated to the Mind; for without theſe accidental Qualities, it would be as impoſſible for us to feel any Body or material Object, as it is impoſſible for us to feel the Air when the Weather is perfectly calm.

From hence proceeds the Operations of one Part of Matter upon another.

Sect. 10. In the ſame Manner, by conſidering how our other Senſations are communicated, we ſhall find that if it were not for theſe accidental Qualities given to Matter by the continual Influence of Spirit, no Part of Matter could operate upon another Part of Matter, ſo as to communicate any new Idea to us, nor could we either See, Hear, Smell, or Taſte any material Object. The Motion of the Parts of Fire communicates Motion to the Parts of every other Piece of Matter that is thrown into it, and by that Means at laſt diſſolves or deſtroys the Coheſion which before united the Parts of that Piece of Matter ſo cloſely and ſtrongly together, which Coheſion, with reſpect to ſome Sorts of Matter, never returns; but with reſpect to other Sorts, ſuch as Metals, Wax, Tallow, *&c.* the Coheſion returns ſoon after they are removed from the Fire, unleſs the Fire be extremely fierce or long continued.

And all the Ideas communicated to us by Rays of Light.

Sect. 11. The minute Particles that are conſtantly emitted from the Sun, from a Fire, or from a Candle, enter at our Eyes, and by communicating their Motion to the Retina and Optic Nerve, excite in the Mind that Idea we call Light; or by makeing an Impulſe upon any Part of the Body, and communicating their Motion to the Nerves in that Part, they excite in our Minds the Idea we call Heat; which Impulſe, when moderate, communicates to us the Idea we call Pleaſure, but when it is violent, it communicates to us the Idea we call Pain: Likewiſe the ſame minute Particles, being as is ſuppoſed, of different Magnitudes, by being reflected from other external Objects, communicate to us an Infinite Number of different natural Ideas, which, by abſtracting, we rank under that general Idea called Colour.

Sect. 12. The Tremors or Motions that are communicated to the Air by ſounding Bodies, are by the Air's entering at our Ears communicated to the auditory Nerves, and by that Means an Infinite Number of different natural Ideas are communicated to the Mind, which, by abſtracting, we rank under that general Idea called Sound.

Likewiſe our Ideas of Sounds.

Sect. 13. The minute Particles that are conſtantly emitted from odoriferous Bodies, by making an Impulſe upon the Nerves within the Noſe, communicate various Sorts of Motions to thoſe Nerves, according to the different Magnitudes, Figures, and Motions of thoſe Particles, by which Means an Infinite Variety of natural Ideas, are communicated to the Mind, which, by abſtracting, we rank under that general Idea called Smell.

Alſo thoſe of Smells.

Sect. 14. And the various Sorts of Impulſes that are made upon the Nerves of the Palate or Tongue, by the Particles of ſavoury Bodies, according to the different Mag-

And thoſe of Taſte.

Magnitude, Figure, and Motion of thoſe Particles, communicate their Motion to thoſe Nerves, and by that Means communicate to the Mind an infinite Variety of natural Ideas, which, by abſtracting, we rank under that general Idea called Taſte.

From hence we muſt conclude, that there is no real *vis Inertiæ* in Matter.

Sect. 15. From what I have ſaid, I ſhall draw the following Concluſions, which will contribute towards our forming proper Notions of the nature of that Subſtance we call Matter, and of the Effects that are produced by the Influence or Action of Spirit upon it. And firſt, we muſt conclude, that though Matter is commonly ſaid to have a *vis Inertiæ*, or Propenſity to continue its ſtate of Motion or Reſt, till ſome external Force acts upon it, yet it cannot be properly ſaid, that Matter has really in itſelf, and from its own Nature, any *Vis*, or any Propenſity, either to continue at Reſt or in Motion. For as Reſt is nothing but a Part or Piece of Matter's remaining in the ſame Place or Part of Space, and as Motion is nothing but a Part or Piece of Matter's changing or removing from one Place or Part of Space to another; and as there is no natural Affinity or Connection between any one Part of Matter, and any one Part of Space, therefore we cannot ſuppoſe that Matter has, in its own Nature, any *Vis*, or any Propenſity, to continue in any one Place, or Part of Space, rather than in any other. Matter, indeed, from its paſſive, or rather inactive Nature, muſt continue at Reſt, that is to ſay, every Part of it muſt remain in the Place where it is, till ſome Spirit acts upon it mediately or immediately; but then if it were not for the accidental Quality of Attraction or Gravitation, the leaſt Force or Power of Spirit, would be ſufficient for ſetting the greateſt Quantity of Matter in Motion: It is from this accidental Quality of Attraction or Gravitation that Matter ſeems to have a Propenſity to continue at Reſt; becauſe by means of this Quality, every Part of Matter has a real Propenſity, a real *Vis* or Power, to remain in the Place where it is, till it be moved out of it, by ſome Force or Power, ſuperior to its Force or Power of Gravitation. For this Reaſon it is, that we cannot move a large Stone, or great Weight; becauſe its Power of Gravitation is greater, than the Power we can apply for moving it, and not becauſe there is any *Vis*, or any Propenſity in Matter, or in the Matter of which that Stone is compoſed, to remain at Reſt, or to remain in the Place where it is; for let us but undermine that very Stone, and remove thoſe Parts of Matter which prevent its approaching nearer to the Centre of the Earth than it then is, Magnitude, Figure, and Motion of thoſe Particles, communicate their Motion to thoſe Nerves, and by that Means communicate to the Mind an infinite Variety of natural Ideas, which, by abſtracting, we rank under that general Idea called Taſte.

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Sect. 15. From what I have ſaid, I ſhall draw the following Concluſions, which will contribute towards our forming proper Notions of the nature of that Subſtance we call Matter, and of the Effects that are produced by the Influence or Action of Spirit upon it. And firſt, we muſt conclude, that though Matter is commonly ſaid to have a *vis Inertiæ*, or Propenſity to continue its ſtate of Motion or Reſt, till ſome external Force acts upon it, yet it cannot be properly ſaid, that Matter has really in itſelf, and from its own Nature, any *Vis*, or any Propenſity, either to continue at Reſt or in Motion. For as Reſt is nothing but a Part or Piece of Matter's remaining in the ſame Place or Part of Space, and as Motion is nothing but a Part or Piece of Matter's changing or removing from one Place or Part of Space to another; and as there is no natural Affinity or Connection between any one Part of Matter, and any one Part of Space, therefore we cannot ſuppoſe that Matter has, in its own Nature, any *Vis*, or any Propenſity, to continue in any one Place, or Part of Space, rather than in any other. Matter, indeed, from its paſſive, or rather inactive Nature, muſt continue at Reſt, that is to ſay, every Part of it muſt remain in the Place where it is, till ſome Spirit acts upon it mediately or immediately; but then if it were not for the accidental Quality of Attraction or Gravitation, the leaſt Force or Power of Spirit, would be ſufficient for ſetting the greateſt Quantity of Matter in Motion: It is from this accidental Quality of Attraction or Gravitation that Matter ſeems to have a Propenſity to continue at Reſt; becauſe by means of this Quality, every Part of Matter has a real Propenſity, a real *Vis* or Power, to remain in the Place where it is, till it be moved out of it, by ſome Force or Power, ſuperior to its Force or Power of Gravitation. For this Reaſon it is, that we cannot move a large Stone, or great Weight; becauſe its Power of Gravitation is greater, than the Power we can apply for moving it, and not becauſe there is any *Vis*, or any Propenſity in Matter, or in the Matter of which that Stone is compoſed, to remain at Reſt, or to remain in the Place where it is; for let us but undermine that very Stone, and remove thoſe Parts of Matter which prevent its approaching nearer to the Centre of the Earth than it then is, it will be ſo far from remaining at Reſt, that it will of itſelf, that is to ſay, by Means of its own Power of Gravitation, begin to move towards the Centre of the Earth, and will move with a Quantity of Motion, exactly in Proportion to the Quantity of Matter of which it is compoſed.

Matter's continuing in Motion proceeds from the Nature of Power, and not from any *vis Inertiæ* in Matter.

Sect. 16. Then again, with Regard to Matter's having in its own Nature any *Vis* or Propenſity to continue in Motion, it muſt be allowed, that any Part of Matter, being once put in Motion, will continue in Motion, till ſome external Force acts upon it, that is to ſay till ſome Spirit, mediately or immediately, acts upon it, and makes it ceaſe moving; but this proceeds from the Nature of Power or Activity, and not from the Nature of Matter; for as Power cannot be oppoſed, diminiſhed, or deſtroyed, but by a counter-acting Power, if a Part of Matter be, by any Power, made to move, that Power which made it move from the firſt ſuppoſable Point of Space to the ſecond, would be equally ſufficient to make it move from the ſecond to the third, from the third to the fourth, and ſo on *in infinitum*, if it were never to meet with any counter-acting Power. This, I ſay, would be the certain Conſequence from the Nature of Power, and the abſolute paſſivity or rather inactivity of Matter; but as every Part of Matter that is put in Motion within the Sphere of the Earth's Attraction, meets with a continual Oppoſition, and conſequently with a continual Diminution of that Power which firſt ſet it in Motion, from the Gravitation of the Air, from its own Gravitation, and from the Friction of thoſe Parts of Matter it touches in its Paſſage, which Friction proceeds from the Coheſion, Attraction and Gravitation of thoſe Parts, therefore the motive Power of every ſuch Part of Matter muſt at laſt be entirely deſtroyed, and conſequently that Part of Matter muſt at laſt come to reſt, or to remain in the Place in which it is forced to remain by the Power of its own Gravitation, and the Coheſion of thoſe Parts of Matter, which are between it and the Centre of the Earth.

Reſiſtance not a Quality eſſential to the Nature of Matter.

Sect. 17. Secondly, We muſt conclude, That as the Quality by which Matter communicates to us the natural Idea we call Reſiſtance, is a Quality which proceeds from the accidental Qualities of Communication of Motion, Coheſion, Attraction, and Repulſion, therefore, though this Quality be a Quality eſſential for rendering Matter capable of communicating any Idea to us, yet it is not a Quality eſſential to the

the Nature of Matter; for Matter would ſtill preſerve its Extenſion, Impenetrability, Diviſibility, and Paſſivity, though not communicable to us, and conſequently would be an Exiſtence different from Space, though it communicated to us no Idea of Reſiſtance, nor any Idea at all. Reſiſtance therefore, is an Idea or Quality eſſential to our abſtract Idea of the Subſtance called Matter, becauſe without it we never would, nor ever could have formed any ſuch abſtract Idea; but it is not an eſſential Quality with regard to the Nature of the Subſtance itſelf; becauſe we may ſuppoſe that an extenſive, impenetrable, diviſible, paſſive Subſtance may exiſt, without neceſſarily ſuppoſing that Subſtance indued with a Power or Quality of communicating to us the natural Idea called Reſiſtance, or any other natural Idea at all.

What we call Creation, explained.

Sect. 18. Thirdly, We muſt conclude, that, if it were not for the Quality of communicating or transferring Motion, and the Qualities of Coheſion, Attraction, and Repulſion, which I have ſhewn to be only accidental Qualities of Matter, given to it by the Influence or Action of ſome Spirit, no Part of Matter could communicate any Idea to us; and therefore we muſt conclude, that even Matter itſelf firſt began, and ſtill continues, to be what we call ſomething, by the Interpoſition of that Influence only, and conſequently muſt neceſſarily ceaſe to be ſomething, and become what we properly call nothing, as ſoon as that Influence is withdrawn. (*a*) From hence we muſt conclude, with the great Law-giver of the *Jews*, that from nothing God Created all Things, and to nothing they muſt return, whenever he pleaſes to withdraw his Influence; and with our great Sir ISAAC NEWTON we muſt ſuppoſe, that at the Beginning, or at the Creation, God formed Matter in ſolid, maſſy, hard, impenetrable, moveable Particles, of ſuch Sizes and Figures, and with ſuch other Properties, and in ſuch Proportion to Space, as moſt conduced to the End for which he formed them (*b*); that is to ſay, that he gave to the ſeveral Primary conſtituent Parts of the ſeveral Sorts of Matter now exiſting in the Univerſe, the Qualities before mentioned, in thoſe ſeveral Proportions and Degrees which were moſt proper for his Purpoſes, and which he ſtill, by his Influence, uniformly and conſtantly preſerves.

The Primary conſtituent Parts of all Sorts of Matter muſt proceed

Sect. 19. It was by the Influence of the Supreme and Over-ruling Spirit only, that even

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(*a*) Chap. ii. (*b*) See *Newton*'s Opticks.

from, and be preſerved by ſome over-ruling Spirit.

even the Primary conſtituent Parts of each Sort of Matter was at firſt ſormed, it is by his Influence only that they are ſtill preſerved; for as Matter is diviſible *in infinitum*, we muſt ſuppoſe, that even thoſe Primary conſtituent Parts have Parts, which Parts could not ſtick or cohere together ſo as to form the Primary conſtituent Parts of any Sort of Matter, without the Influence of the Supreme and Univerſal Spirit; and how incomprehenſibly minute the Primary conſtituent Parts of ſome Sorts of Matter muſt be, there are many Experiments which clearly evince. By Experience we know, that $5\frac{1}{7}$ Cubic Lines (*a*) of Gold is often, by Gold-beaters and Wire-drawers, divided into 651,590 equal Parts; and yet each of thoſe Parts, in all Probability, contain a great Number of the Primary conſtituent Parts which form that Sort of Metal we call Gold. A Candle, according to Computation from Experiments, would fill with luminous Particles, ſo as to be perceptible to the naked Eye, a Sphere, whoſe Diameter is four Miles, and that before it had loſt any ſenſible Part of its Weight; ſo that there muſt be in every Part of that Sphere a ſufficient quantity of luminous Particles, for

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(*a*) A Cubic Line is but the 2,985,984th Part of a Cubic Foot.

for making ſuch an Impulſe upon the Retina of the Eye as to communicate to us that Idea we call Light. And there are Perfumes, which, without a ſenſible Diminution of their Quantity, will fill a very large Space, with their odoriferous Particles, which muſt therefore be inconceivably ſmall, ſince there muſt be a ſufficient Number in every Part of that Space, for making ſuch an Impulſe upon the Nerves within the Noſe, as may communicate to us the Idea of a Smell; and what is ſtill more ſurprizing theſe Perfumes will produce the ſame Effect at many different Times, and in many different Places, and ſtill without any ſenſible Diminution of their Quantity.

Conſequently the Variety we obſerve in Nature muſt proceed from that Spirit.

Sect. 20. From theſe and many other Experiments, we may ſee, how incomprehenſibly ſmall the Primary conſtituent Parts of the ſeveral Sorts of Matter muſt be; and yet it muſt be from the different Magnitude and Form of thoſe conſtituent Parts, and the different Degrees of the Qualities of communicating Motion, Coheſion, Attraction, and Repulſion, given to them, or to the Parts of each conſtituent Part, that that infinite Variety proceeds, which we obſerve in the Nature of material Things or Subſtances; and as thoſe Qualities were at firſt given, and are ſtill preſerved by the Influence of

voluntary

Spirit only, therefore we muſt grant that all that beautiful Variety which we obſerve in Nature, proceeds from the Influence or Action of Spirit upon Matter, and not from the Nature of Matter itſelf.

Sect. 21. Fourthly, We muſt conclude, That, according to the common Courſe of Things, we can receive by Senſation no Idea but by Means of ſome material Object; and therefore can have no Idea of any external Spirit, unleſs it actuates, or acts upon ſome Part of Matter. I ſay, according to the common Courſe of Things; for as every Man is fully ſenſible, from his voluntary Motions or Actions, that his own Spirit or Soul has a Power to give or communicate Motion originally to ſome Parts of his Body, perhaps to thoſe which we call the Animal Spirits, he does not know but that there may be other Spirits, that have a Power of communicating or giving Motion originally to any Part or Parts of Matter they pleaſe; and ſuch Spirits by communicating originally to our Organs of Senſation, the ſame ſort of Motion that is communicated by a proper material Object, might certainly communicate to, or excite in our Minds, the ſame Ideas that are communicated or excited by a proper material Object; from whence we would of Courſe think

The Poſſibility of what we call Ghoſts or Apparitions.

think or imagine, we Felt, Saw, Heard Taſted, or Smelt a Body or material Object, though there were no ſuch Body or material Object in the Place where we imagined it to be; and if that imaginary material Object did not upon Examination, properly affect our other Senſations, we would then conclude, that it was what we call a Ghoſt or Apparition.

CHAP. X.

The Miſtakes of Mr. STRUTT's Philoſophical Enquiry, *demonſtrated from the foregoing Principles.*

Chief Cauſe of the Errors this ingenious Author has fallen into.

Sect. I. I Hope I have now put every one of my Readers into a way of forming proper and diſtinct abſtract Ideas of Space, of Matter, and of Spirit; and as one who has formed ſuch Ideas, may eaſily ſee the Miſtakes of thoſe who ſet up to argue about Space, Matter, and Spirit, before they have formed a proper and diſtinct Idea of any one of them; I believe I need not take up much Time in ſhewing the Miſtakes which the Ingenious Author of *The* Philoſophical Enquiry *into the* Phyſical Spring *of* Human Actions, *&c.* has fallen into, by not having formed proper and diſtinct

Ideas of Matter and Spirit, before he began to write upon the Subject. I ſay, the Ingenious Author; for though he has fallen into ſeveral Miſtakes, yet the whole Piece ſhews him to have been a Gentleman of an excellent Genius for Philoſophical Enquiries, and a cloſe Reaſoner from thoſe Principles he lays down. But like moſt others who have wrote upon the ſame Side of the Queſtion, he has laid down wrong Principles, as I ſhall, I hope, clearly demonſtrate to every one who underſtands what is or ought to be meant by the abſtract general Names, Matter and Spirit.

The abſtract Term Animal, explained.

Sect. 2. In his very firſt Paragraph he tells us, that, " The Notion which gene-" rally prevails at preſent is, that Man con-" ſiſts of Animal and Rational Nature, the " former of which is admitted to be only " Matter, under that peculiar Organization, " and therefore mechanical, and ſubject to " all the Laws of Mechaniſm. " Where and among whom this Notion prevails, I am quite Ignorant; for I am ſure it cannot prevail among thoſe who have formed proper and diſtinct Ideas of Matter and Spirit, or of the Animal and Rational Nature. What we mean by the Word or Term Animal, is, an organized Piece or Part of Matter, capable of Self, or Voluntary-motion;

and therefore an Animal muſt appear, from what I have before ſaid, to be a compound Subſtance, conſiſting of a material organized Subſtance, and a ſpiritual Subſtance: Conſequently the Word or Term Animal, is, and is always underſtood to be a general Term, which comprehends under it the two leſs general Terms, Brute and Rational.

It has no oppoſite general Term of the ſame Degree.

Sect. 3. Therefore the proper oppoſite Term to the Rational Nature, or a Rational Animal, is the Brute Nature or a Brute Animal; and the proper Difference between them is, that the Spiritual Subſtance or Being which actuates the material Part of the Rational Animal, is indued with Qualities, which upon the moſt ſtrict Examination we can find no Signs of in the Spiritual Subſtance or Being that actuates the material Part of any Sort of Brute Animal; but the Word or general Term, Animal, neither has, nor can have an oppoſite general Term of the ſame Degree; becauſe it is a Compoſition of the two next moſt general Terms, *viz.* Matter and Spirit; and therefore, when we have a Mind to put any Subſtance or Being in Oppoſition to Animal, we muſt ſay, it is a Subſtance or Being meerly Spiritual, or meerly Material.

The Spiritual Part of the Animal Nature not ſubject to

Sect. 4. Thus it appears, that if we ſpeak properly and diſtinctly, we muſt ſay, that the Laws of Mechaniſm.

that Man, as well as every other Animal, conſiſts of a material and a Spiritual Subſtance or Nature, the former of which is mechanical, and ſubject to all the Laws of Mechaniſm; but the latter is an immaterial Subſtance, which actuates as it pleaſes ſome Parts of the material, and by their means the other Parts, without being ſubject, in its original Operation, to any of the Laws of Mechaniſm; and no Philoſopher will, I believe, ſay, that this is an unphiloſophical Notion. No Man therefore that has formed proper Ideas of the Animal Nature, or of the two leſs general Terms comprehended under it, the Rational Nature and the Brute Nature, will admit any of them to be only Matter, under that peculiar Organization, and therefore mechanical, and ſubject to all the Laws of Mechaniſm; becauſe each of theſe Natures muſt be allowed to be a Compoſition of a material Subſtance and a Spiritual Subſtance, the latter of which can admit of no Organization, nor any mechanical Modification of Parts; for no Spirit, or Being, purely Spiritual, can, as I have ſhewn, have any Parts. (*a*)

We can receive no Idea of a ſpiritual Subſtance by Senſation

Sect. 5. The next Miſtake I ſhall take Notice of, is in the firſt Axiom or Conſideration, as he calls it, which he lays down in his fourth Section, *viz.* " That we have no right;

(*a*) Chap. viii. Sect. 10.

“ Ideas of Subſtance, but thoſe which have “ been received by our Senſes from external “ Objects.” If the Author had ſaid that we have no Ideas of *material* Subſtance, but thoſe which have been received by our Senſes from external Objects, he had been right; but I hope neither he, nor any other Philoſopher will ſay, that we have no Ideas communicated to us by reflecting upon the Qualities and Operations of our own Minds. From the Ideas that are communicated by our Senſes, we form that abſtract compounded Idea which we call a material Subſtance, and of this Subſtance we can neither receive nor form any Idea but what is originally communicated to us by the Senſes from external Objects: But we have another Channel by which Ideas are communicated to us, *viz.* that of Reflection. By this Channel we receive the Ideas of the Qualities of our own Spirit or Soul, from whence we form that general Idea which we call a Spiritual Subſtance or Being; and of this Subſtance or Being, we neither have nor can receive, any Idea by the Senſes from any external Object whatſoever. (*a*)

Texture and Frame are Qualities which cannot be predicated of any ſpiritual Subſtance.

Sect. 6. The laſt Miſtake I think neceſſary to take Notice of, is in his Thirty-

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(*a*) Chap. v. Sect. 10. 12. Chap. viii. Sect 6. Chap. ix. Sect. 21.

third Section, where he lays down ſeveral Propoſitions, the firſt of which is, "That "every Quality or Attribute, that can be "affirmed of any Subject, muſt neceſſarily "be the Reſult of the Texture and Frame "of the Subject, of which it may be pre-"dicated." Here again, if the Author had ſaid, That every Quality or Attribute, that can be affirmed of any *material* Subject, *&c.* he had been Right; but did any one ever hear of the Texture and Frame of a ſpiritual Subſtance or Subject? Muſt not every one that underſtands what he means by Texture and Frame, grant, that they are Qualities that can be affirmed or predicated of nothing but a *material* Subſtance? And I have, I think, clearly ſhewn, that Self-motion or Activity, Perception, *&c.* are Qualities that cannot poſſibly Exiſt in any Subſtance meerly Material, nor proceed originally from the Texture and Frame of any material Subſtance (*a*); therefore the Motions, Actions, and Thoughts of Men, are Qualities or Attributes that may be predicated of that compound Subſtance or Subject called Man, and yet they neither are nor can be the Reſult of the Texture and Frame of any Subject: They muſt be the Reſult of that

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(*a*) Chap. iv. v. vi. and vii.

Part of the compound Subject called Man, which has neither Texture nor Frame, I mean the Spiritual Part of his compound Being, which, according to the Nature of every active Being, is itſelf the Spring, though not the Phyſical Spring of its own Actions.

Error of this and all other Materialiſts.

Sect. 7. From all which it is plain, that this Author had never taken Care to conſider thoroughly the Nature of thoſe Ideas that are communicated to us by Reflecting upon the Qualities and Operations of our own Minds; for if he had, he might, and from this Specimen of his Genius we may Judge, that he certainly would have formed a proper and diſtinct Idea of a ſpiritual Subſtance; and upon Compariſon he would ſoon have diſcovered, that our Knowledge of a ſpiritual Subſtance was as full and as evident, as our Knowledge of a material Subſtance.

Sect. 8. But this Author, like other Materialiſts, neglected that Source of Knowledge called Reflection, and endeavoured to form an Idea of Spirit by Senſation; for which Purpoſe he attributed to what he called Spirit, ſome of thoſe Qualities, the Ideas of which we receive only by our Senſes from external Objects; and from thence he concluded that Spirit muſt be material, as well as the external Objects, which firſt communicated to his Mind the Ideas of thoſe Qualities.

Sect. 9. As theſe Gentlemen never ſeriouſly reflect upon the Qualities and Operations of their own Minds, ſuch as Self-motion or Activity, Perception, *&c.* or at leaſt never examine whether thoſe Qualities are ſuch as can exiſt in, or belong to a Subſtance meerly Material, under any poſſible Organization or Modification, they never form an abſtract Idea of any Subſtance, but that of a material Subſtance; from whence they raſhly conclude, that no other Subſtance or Being exiſts in *rerum Natura*; therefore the only Method that can be taken for convincing them of their Error, is by ſhewing them how to form, and that they muſt form as ſoon as they reflect ſeriouſly upon what they feel within, a proper and diſtinct Idea of a ſpiritual Subſtance, which, I hope, I have done in the former Part of this Diſſertation.

CHAP. XI.

The Miſtakes of Mr. COLLINS's Philoſophical Enquiry, *demonſtrated.*

Sect 1. HAVING now, I think, demonſtrated, that there exiſts in Nature, an Immaterial active Subſtance or Being, as well as a material paſſive Subſtance, and having ſhewn the chief Error of thoſe who deny the Exiſtence of the former, I ſhall proceed to examine ſome of the other Qualities or Faculties with which we find, by Reflection, our own Spirits indued; in order to ſhew, how far the Motions, Actions, and Thoughts of Men, may be deemed Neceſſary, and how far they may be deemed Free or Voluntary. For this purpoſe, inſtead of perplexing myſelf or my Readers with Definitions, as moſt Writers upon this Subject have done, I ſhall endeavour to ſhew, how we receive or form thoſe Ideas, to which we have given the Names, Liberty and Neceſſity, or Neceſſary and Voluntary. Introduction

Sect. 2. Motion I have before ſhewn to be an Idea that is communicated to us by our own Bodies, by ſeveral Members of our Our Idea called Neceſſity, explained.

Body, and by many external Objects. When I move my Body, my Hand or my Finger, it not only communicates to me the Idea called Motion, but it likewiſe communicates to me the Idea of that Quality which I call the ſelf-motive or active Power or Faculty of my Spirit; and as I find, upon Reflection, that I may either riſe up or ſit ſtill; that I may move my Hand or Finger, or let it alone; that I may move my Hand upwards or downwards, to the Right or to the Left, *&c.* I from thence receive the Idea of another Quality of my Spirit, which we call the Will, or the Faculty of Volition, and therefore I call that Motion of my Body, my Hand, or Finger, a Voluntary-motion (*a*). Then when another Perſon pulls me from my Seat, or takes hold of my Hand or Finger, and forces it to move, though this Motion proceeds from the Volition of another Spirit, yet as it does not, I find, proceed from that Quality of my own Spirit which I call Volition, it gives me an Idea of another Sort of Motion, to which I give the Name, neceſſary Motion; and from thence, by abſtracting, I form that general Idea, to which we give the Name, Neceſſity.

(*a*) Chap. iv.

Sect. 3. After having thus acquired the Idea we call Neceſſity, I reconſider the two Sorts of Motion which gave Occaſion to my forming this Idea, and the State I was in when theſe two Sorts of Motion were produced; and as I find by Reflection, that the former Sort of Motion proceeded entirely from that Quality of my Spirit which I call Volition, and that the latter did not proceed from that Quality, but from a Force put upon me, or a Neceſſity I was under, I from thence receive the Ideas of two different States I was in, the former of which I call a State of Freedom or Liberty, and the latter I call a State of Neceſſity or Compulſion; and then, by abſtracting, I form that general Idea, to which we have given the Name, Freedom or Liberty.

Our Ideas called Liberty, explained.

Sect. 4. From hence it muſt appear, that the natural Ideas from which we form the abſtract Ideas called Liberty and Neceſſity, are Ideas that never were, nor ever can be communicated to us, any other way than by Reflecting upon the Qualities and Operations of our own Minds; but after we have once by Reflection received ſuch natural Ideas, and from them formed ſuch abſtract Ideas, we then apply thoſe abſtract

Our Ideas of the Liberty or Neceſſity of the Motions of external Objects, how formed.

Ideas to the Motions of external Objects; and when, after the moſt ſtrict Examination, we find or ſuppoſe, that the Motions of any external Object, proceed from a ſelf-motive Power or Quality in that Object, we conclude that it muſt be actuated by a Spirit of its own; and we likewiſe conclude, that its Spirit muſt be indued with that Quality which we call Volition, and conſequently that its Motions muſt be Voluntary or free Motions. On the other hand, when, after the moſt ſtrict Examination, we find or ſuppoſe, that the Motions of any external Object do not proceed from a ſelf-motive Power in that Object, we either conclude, that it is not actuated by a Spirit of its own, that therefore it can have no ſuch Quality as that we call Volition, and conſequently that its Motions muſt be all neceſſary; or we conclude, that, if it be an Animal, its Motions do not at that Time proceed from its own Spirit, and that therefore they muſt be Neceſſary and not Voluntary.

Our Ideas of our own Liberty formed by Reflection, thoſe of the Liberty of other Animals, by Senſation and Judgment.

Sect. 5. After having thus ſhewn, how we come to form thoſe Ideas which we call Liberty and Neceſſity, every one muſt ſee, that no Man can have an immediate or intuitive Knowledge, with

Regard to the Liberty or Neceſſity of the Motions or Actions of any other Being: He can judge of them only by comparing them with his own Motions or Actions; and from that Compariſon he determines, whether he ought to call them Free or Neceſſary. But with Reſpect to a Man's own Motions or Actions, every one has by reflecting upon what he feels within, an immediate and intuitive Knowledge, by which he can determine, whether they be Free or Neceſſary; and therefore, if a Man will inſiſt upon it, that by Reflection upon what he feels within, he perceives no Difference between his Idea of that Motion which is given to his Body, or to any of the Members thereof, by an external or convulſive Force, and his Idea of that Motion which is given to it by his own Spirit or Soul, according to the Direction of that Faculty which we call the Will, it would be as ridiculous to endeavour by Argument to convince him of it, or rather to make him confeſs it, as it would be to endeavour by Argument to convince him, or to make him confeſs, that he feels Pain when his Hand is in the Fire, in caſe he ſhould take it in his Head to deny it. Nay if

Mankind did not evidently perceive a Difference between theſe two Sorts of Motion, there never would be, nor ever could have been, any Diſpute about the Liberty or Neceſſity of Human Action or Motion; for if they had not perceived this Difference, they would never have diſtinguiſhed Motion into two Claſſes or Sorts, and conſequently could never have given a diſtinct Name to each; nor could they have ever formed any ſuch Ideas as thoſe we call Liberty and Neceſſity.

Sophiſtical Argument for Neceſſity, ſtated.

Sect. 6. Some of the Advocates for Neceſſity, ſeem to have been ſenſible of this Abſurdity, and therefore they have brought themſelves into another Abſurdity, by ſaying, that the Motive for Action or Motion is the Cauſe of thoſe Actions or Motions which we call voluntary or Self-motions; and having once laid this down as a Principle, they from thence argue, that, as every Cauſe muſt neceſſarily produce its Effect, therefore the Motion or Action produced or cauſed by the Motive, muſt be a neceſſary Effect, and conſequently muſt be a neceſſary Motion or Action. Now to ſhew the Abſurdity of this Principle, and conſequently the Falſhood of the Argument built upon it, I muſt conſider what is properly meant by the Words Motive, Cauſe, and Effect.

What we call the Reaſons for Judging, explained.

Sect. 7. Beſides the Qualities or Faculties of Activity and Perception, the Mind of Man is indued with a great many other Faculties, the Ideas of which are all diſtinctly communicated to us by Reflection, and to a great Number of them we have given diſtinct and particular Names. Of theſe I need only take Notice at preſent, of the comparing, diſcerning, reaſoning, and judging or determining Faculties. The Faculty of comparing is that by which we compare two or more Ideas together, in order to ſee whether there is any Agreement or Diſagreement between them; and when we immediately and intuitively diſcover an Agreement or Diſagreement between them, we call the Faculty by which we diſcover that Agreement or Diſagreement, the diſcerning Faculty. But in many Caſes we cannot diſcover the Agreement or Diſagreement we are in ſearch of, by an immediate Compariſon of the two Ideas then under our Examination, and when this happens to be the Caſe, we find we have another Faculty, by which we call to our Aſſiſtance ſome third Idea, and by comparing each of the two other Ideas with that third Idea, we diſcover Agreements or Diſagreements between the two, which we could not have diſcovered by any immediate Compariſon between theſe two Ideas. This Faculty we call the reaſoning Faculty; and thoſe who are converſant in the Sciences, eſpecially the Mathematicks, know, that it may be purſued to a very great Length, and through a great many different Steps. When by this means we diſcover an Agreement or Diſagreement between two Ideas, or between two Propoſitions, we call the Faculty by which we perceive this Agreement or Diſagreement, the judging or determining Faculty; and the Agreements or Diſagrements which we diſcerned between the ſeveral intermediate Ideas made uſe of upon any ſuch Occaſion, we call the Reaſons for our judging or determining.

What we call Motive, explained.

Sect. 8. By reflecting upon what paſſes within, we find, that we generally make uſe of our Faculties of comparing and diſcerning, or of our Faculties of reaſoning and judging, with regard to moſt of the Motions we make, and moſt of the Actions we perform; becauſe there are very few of them but what are, or may be attended with a preſent or a future Good or Evil, either of a publick or private Nature. For Example: I have a Draught of Phyſick to take, I know it is nauſeous, therefore my taking it will be attended with a preſent Evil; but as I know or ſuppoſe it to be neceſſary for my Health, therefore my not taking it will be attended with a future Evil: I compare theſe two Conſequences together, and if I judge that the preſent Evil will not be near ſo great as the future Evil, I not only ought, but probably will, ſwallow down the bitter Draught. With Regard to moſt of the Motions and Actions of our Lives, the Caſe is the ſame: We compare the Conſequences together; and the Diſcernment we make, or the Judgment we paſs, may be called the Reaſon of the Action or Motion, and is generally what prevails with us to perform it, or to let it alone; but as we do not often take Notice of the Progreſs the Mind makes in comparing theſe Conſequences together, therefore we conſider only that which upon the Compariſon was the moſt prevalent, and that we call the Motive for performing the Action or for letting it alone; ſo that Reaſon and Motive are in Effect two Words for the ſame Idea, only when it relates to Thoughts we call it Reaſon, and when it relates to Actions or Motions we call it Motive; though in this laſt Caſe, we often call it Reaſon as well as Motive; for I may ſay, a Man had no Reaſon, or a good Reaſon, for ſo doing, as well as ſay, that he had no Motive, or a good Motive, for ſo doing.

What we call Cauſe and Effect, explained.

Sect. 9. Now with Regard to the Terms, Cauſe and Effect: When a Melting-pot full of Lead, is put upon the Fire, and kept there till the Lead melts, it communicates to me two Ideas, one of which I call Cauſe, and the other, Effect: When a moving Ball ſtrikes againſt a Ball at Reſt, and by the Impulſe puts it in Motion, it communicates to me two Ideas, one of which I call Cauſe, and the other, Effect. In the firſt Caſe, I call the Fire, or the Heat of the Fire, the Cauſe; and the melting of the Lead, I call the Effect: In the latter Caſe, I call the impelling Ball, or the Motion of the impelling Ball, the Cauſe; and the Motion communicated to the impelled Ball, I call the Effect. From theſe two Examples we may ſee, that neither the Idea we call Cauſe, nor the Idea we call Effect, can be communicated, till ſome Effect be produced; for till ſome Effect be produced, the Cauſe is only an active Power in that Being or Subſtance which may produce an Effect; and the Effect is only a paſſive Power in that Being or Subſtance, in which the Effect may be produced. Thus the Fire is indued with an active Power or Quality, by which it melts Lead, and Lead is indued with a paſſive Power or Quality, by which it may be melted by that active Power that is in the Fire; but this active Power that is in the Fire, cannot properly be called a Cauſe, till it has actually melted the Lead, nor can the paſſive Power that is in Lead, be properly called an Effect, till the Lead be actually melted.

The Terms Reaſon, Motive, and Cauſe, often promiſcuouſly uſed.

Sect. 10. Having thus ſhewn what is properly meant by the Terms Reaſon, Motive, Cauſe, and Effect, I muſt obſerve, that we often make uſe of the Word Cauſe, inſtead of the Word Reaſon, or Motive. Thus we ſay, a Man's being tired Sitting, is the Cauſe of his getting up; or his being tired Walking, is the Cauſe of his ſitting down. In which Expreſſions, and in all ſuch, we make uſe of the Word Cauſe, inſtead of the Word Motive; for his Spirit or Soul, or the active Part of his compound Being, is properly the Cauſe of that Motion in his Body, which we call getting up or ſitting down; and his being tired Sitting or Walking, is only the Motive that prevails with his Spirit, to give that Motion to his Body; becauſe he knows that getting up in the one Caſe, and ſitting down in the other, will be a Relief from the Uneaſineſs he is then under, and conſequently will be attended with a preſent Good; but if he has ſome ſitting Buſineſs to do, which muſt be done againſt ſuch a Time, or if he has a Journey to make, which muſt be made before Night, he will perhaps continue ſitting or walking, notwithſtanding his being tired, becauſe of the future Good which upon Compariſon he judges to be greater than the preſent. In like manner we ſay, a Man's diſcerning the Connection between the ſeveral Steps or Branches of a Demonſtration, is the Cauſe of his aſſenting to, or acknowledging the Truth of a Propoſition; or we ſay a Man aſſents to a Propoſition, becauſe he intuitively diſcerns the Connection between the ſeveral Steps or Branches of the Demonſtration. In which Expreſſions, and in all ſuch, we make uſe of the Word Cauſe, inſtead of the Word Reaſon.

The Sophiſm above mentioned, ſhewn to be falſe or ridiculous.

Sect. 11. From what I have ſaid, my Readers muſt ſee, that when we ſay, The Motive for Action or Motion is the Cauſe of the Action or Motion, we either make uſe of the Word Cauſe, inſtead of the Word Motive, in which Caſe, it is the ſame as if we ſhould ſay, The Motive for Action or Motion is the Motive of the Action or Motion, the ridiculouſneſs of which muſt at firſt

View appear; or we make uſe of the Word Cauſe in its true and proper Signification, in which Caſe the Principle is falſe; for the Spirit or Soul is the Cauſe of the Action or Motion, and the Moitve is only that which prevails with the Spirit or Soul to produce that Motion in the Body, or to act after that particular Manner. Therefore, when we lay it down as a Principle, that the Motive for Action or Motion is the Cauſe of the Action or Motion, we muſt either talk falſly or ridiculouſly; for if we make uſe of the Word Cauſe in its true and proper Signification, the Propoſition is falſe; and if we make uſe of the Word Cauſe, inſtead of the Word Motive, the Propoſition is ridiculous.

That every Cauſe muſt neceſſarily produce its Effect, ſhewn to be falſe or ridiculous.

Sect. 12. The next Propoſition, *viz.* that every Cauſe muſt neceſſarily produce its Effect, will likewiſe, from what I have ſaid, appear to be ridiculous or falſe; becauſe, if we here make uſe of the Word Cauſe, in its true and proper Signification, the Propoſition is ridiculous; for no Cauſe can be a Cauſe, till it has produced its Effect; and it is ridiculous to ſay a Cauſe muſt neceſſarily produce the Effect it has already produced. If to avoid this Abſurdity, we ſhould ſay, that the active Power that is in any Being, muſt neceſſarily produce its Effect, upon a Being that is indued with a paſſive Power proper for having that Effect produced; for Example, that Fire muſt neceſſarily melt Lead. This likewiſe, will appear to be a ridiculous Propoſition, it being the ſame as if we ſhould ſay, a white Man muſt neceſſarily be white; for while Fire continues to be that Sort of Subſtance we call Fire, it muſt continue to have all thoſe Qualities or Ideas, which are, or ought to be joined together in our abſtract compounded Idea called Fire, among which that of the active Power of melting Lead is one; and while Lead continues to be that Sort of Subſtance we call Lead, it muſt continue to have all thoſe Qualities, which are or ought to be joined together, in our compound Idea called Lead, among which that of the paſſive Power of being melted by Fire is one.

Contrary Motives for almoſt every Action we are capable of.

Sect. 13. Then again, if in this Propoſition we make uſe of the Word Cauſe, inſtead of the Word Motive, the Propoſition muſt appear to be falſe; for no Man will ſay, that every Motive muſt neceſſarily produce its Effect, there being ſeveral Motives, or at leaſt one Motive, againſt, as well as for almoſt every Action or Motion an Animal is capable of; and ſurely no Man will ſay, that when two Motives operate different Ways, both muſt neceſſarily produce their Effect.

Argument for Neceſſity drawn from the Strength or Weakneſs of a Motive anſwered.

Sect. 14. But the Neceſſitarians ſay, that when two Motives operate different Ways, the ſtronger Motive muſt neceſſarily deſtroy the weaker, and ſo will become the neceſſary Cauſe of the Action or Motion; or, if the Motives be equal, no Motion or Action will be produced. In the ſame Manner as when two moving Balls meet in a direct Line, and no Elaſticity in either, if there be a greater Quantity of Motion in the one than there is in the other, the greater or ſtronger Motion will deſtroy the leſſer or weaker, and both Balls will go on in that Direction, which the Ball with the greateſt Quantity of Motion had at the Point or Time of their Meeting: Or, if the Motions in both be exactly equal, and no Elaſticity in either, they will both remain at Reſt in the very Point where they met. To this I anſwer, that when we ſpeak properly, it is ridiculous to talk of the Strength or Weakneſs of a Motive; for every Motive is ſtronger or weaker, according to the Judgment the Mind paſſes, upon comparing it with its contrary Motive; and from hence we may ſee that, properly ſpeaking, it is not the Motive that is either the Cauſe or the Reaſon of the Action or Motion, but the Judgment we form upon comparing two contrary Motives together. It is not the Good I may do to my Health that makes me take a Draught of Phyſick: It is the Judgment I form upon comparing the future with the preſent Evil. If I judge that the future is certain, and much greater than the preſent Evil of ſwallowing that bitter Draught, I ſhall probably ſwallow it down. If I judge that I may retain or recover my Health without ſubmitting to the preſent Evil of ſwallowing ſuch a nauſeous Draught, I ſhall probably throw it into the Fire.

Mr. Collins's firſt and chief Argument for Neceſſity.

Sect. 15. This the great Mr. *Collins* was fully ſenſible of, and therefore he made the Neceſſity he argued for, conſiſt in the laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding; for his Opinion was, that Man has a Power to do as he wills, or pleaſes (*a*); but then he maintained, that our Will or Choice was neceſſarily directed by the laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding, (*b*) that is to ſay, that in all our Actions and Motions we muſt neceſſarily will or chuſe to do that, which by the Judgment of the Underſtanding appears at the Time to be the beſt or fitteſt for us to do; and as all the

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(*a*) Mr. *Collins*'s Treatiſe, P. 97. (*b*) P. 39. 40.

Judgments we form muſt be neceſſarily formed according as Things appear to us at the Time, therefore he concluded, that all the Actions of Man are ſo determined by the Cauſes preceding each Action, that not one paſt Action could poſſibly not have come to paſs, or have been otherwiſe than it hath been; nor one future Action can poſſibly not come to paſs, or be otherwiſe than it ſhall be, conſequently Man muſt be a neceſſary Agent (*a*).

Our Judgments all neceſſary.

Sect. 16. This is the Scope of his firſt Argument for the Neceſſity of Human Action or Motion, when put in its moſt clear and conciſe Light; and if I can ſhew the Falſhood of any Part of it, his whole Chain of Reaſoning, from this Argument at leaſt, muſt fall to the Ground. That Man has a Power to do as he wills or pleaſes, is what every Man muſt allow, and every Man muſt likewiſe allow, that our Judgments are all neceſſarily formed according as Things appear to us at the Time; for it is from Things as they appear to me at the Time, that I judge of the Wiſdom or Fitneſs of an Action or Motion, as well as of the Truth of a Propoſition, and my Judgment is as neceſ-

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(*a*) P. 16. 17

ſary, or as neceſſarily determined, in the former Caſe as in the latter. Therefore, if there be any Thing wrong in this Argument, it muſt be in that Part of it which affirms, that the Will or Choice of Man is neceſſarily directed by the laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding, the Falſhood of which I hope to demonſtrate.

The Will not at all concerned in judging of the Truth or Falſhood of a Propoſition.

Sect. 17. This Aſſertion muſt, indeed, in my Opinion, appear at firſt View to be ridiculous; for if our Will or Choice were neceſſarily determined by the laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding, we could no more have any Will or Choice with Reſpect to the performing or not performing of any Action or Motion, than we have with Reſpect to the believing or not believing the Truth of any Propoſition or Demonſtration; and I muſt refer it to every Man of common Underſtanding, whether he thinks, he would ſpeak properly, if he ſhould ſay, I will, or I will not believe ſuch a Propoſition in *Euclid*, or ſuch a Demonſtration in Mathematicks. Nay with Regard to any Fact, we cannot properly ſay we will or will not believe: Our Will has not the leaſt Concern in the Queſtion; for we muſt believe, or not believe it, according as the Teſtimonies appear to us at the Time. Thus our Author firſt ſtrips Mankind of all Will or Pleaſure, and then gravely tells us, that Man has a Power to do as he wills or pleaſes.

Motives for Action upon what founded.

Sect. 18. But to put this Queſtion in a yet clearer Light, I ſhall examine into the Motives that prompt Men to Action or Motion, which are generally founded in a Good of ſome kind or other; for in all our Actions or Motions that are not of themſelves abſolutely indifferent, we generally have in View, either our own private Good, preſent or future, or ſome ſort of publick Good preſent or future. Having ſaid this, leſt I ſhould be miſunderſtood, I muſt obſerve, that in many of our Actions or Motions, we are prompted by ſome Pain or Uneaſineſs we are then under, but as a Relief from Pain or Uneaſineſs is a private Good, therefore when we perform any Action or Motion, in order to get rid of ſome Pain or Uneaſineſs we are then under, we may be juſtly ſaid to have in View our own private Good. Therefore, I think, I may lay it down as a general Principle, that with Reſpect to all thoſe Actions and Motions that are not in themſelves abſolutely indifferent, the Motives that induce us to perform ſuch Actions or Motions are founded either in the preſent or future Good of Mankind, our Country, our Friends, or our Family, which I call the Publick Good; or they are founded in the preſent or future Good of ourſelves, ſuch as the Gratification of ſome private Paſſion, Affection, or Appetite, or the getting rid of, or avoiding, ſome perſonal Pain or Uneaſineſs, which I call private Good; and as theſe Motives are often contrary to one another, the Liberty of Man conſiſts chiefly in this, that he may chuſe whether he will allow himſelf to be directed, with Reſpect to any particular Action, by thoſe Motives that are founded in the publick Good, or by thoſe contrary Motives that are founded in the private Good; whether he will allow himſelf to be directed by thoſe Motives that are founded in the preſent publick Good, or by thoſe contrary Motives that are founded in the future publick Good; or whether he will allow himſelf to be directed by thoſe Motives that are founded in his preſent private Good, or by thoſe contrary Motives that are founded in his future private Good; or laſtly, whether he will allow himſelf to be directed by none of thoſe Motives, but by what we call Fancy, or Whim, which I ſhall preſently more fully explain.

Mr. Collins from thence ſhewn to be guilty of a great Inaccuracy.

Sect. 19. From this Account of the Motives that prompt Mankind to Action or Motion, one may ſee, that Mr. *Collins*, for as great a Man as he was, has been guilty of a great Inaccuracy, when he ſays, that, "To ſuppoſe a ſenſible Being capable of willing or preferring Miſery, "and refuſing Good, is to deny it to "be really ſenſible; for every Man while "he has his Senſes, aims at Pleaſure and "Happineſs, and avoids Pain and Miſery, "and this in willing Actions which are "ſuppoſed to be attended with the moſt "terrible Conſequences." (*a*) For as Good and Evil, Pleaſure and Pain, and Happineſs and Miſery, are either publick or private, and each of theſe again either preſent or future, if he had expreſſed himſelf accurately, he ſhould either have ſaid, that To ſuppoſe a ſenſible Being capable of willing or preferring preſent publick Miſery, and refuſing preſent publick Good, is to deny it to be really ſenſible; or he ſhould have ſaid, that to ſuppoſe a ſenſible Being capable of willing or preferring future publick Miſery, and refuſing future publick Good, is to deny it to be really ſenſible; or he ſhould have ſaid, that, to ſuppoſe a ſenſible Being capable of willing or preferring preſent private Miſery, and refuſing

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(*a*) Ibid. P. 40.

ſing preſent private Good, is to deny it to be really ſenſible; or laſtly he ſhould have ſaid, that to ſuppoſe a ſenſible Being capable of willing or preferring future private Miſery, and refuſing future private Good, is to deny it to be really ſenſible.

The Nature of Virtue and Wiſdom explained.

Sect. 20. I ſay, if he had argued accurately and fairly, he muſt have expreſſed himſelf in one of theſe four Methods, and if he had expreſſed himſelf in any one of the four, his Aſſertion would at firſt View have appeared to have been falſe; for as private Good, Pleaſure, or Happineſs, is often publick Evil, or Miſery; and as preſent Good, Pleaſure, or Happineſs, is often attended with future Evil, Pain, or Miſery; it is in preferring a private Miſery preſent or future, or refuſing a private Good preſent or future, for the Sake of ſome publick Good preſent or future, that Virtue conſiſts; and it is in foreſeeing the Conſequences of Things and preferring a preſent Miſery, publick or private, or refuſing a preſent Good, publick or private, for the Sake of ſome future Good, publick or private, that Wiſdom conſiſts.

The Will not concerned in judging of the Right or Wrong of Actions, nor determi-

Sect. 21. Every good Man will expoſe himſelf to Miſery, if he can by ſo doing procure Happineſs to Mankind, his Country, his Friends or his Family: Every good

Man

ned by the Judgment,

Man will refuſe the greateſt private Good that can be offered, if he finds he muſt, by embracing it, expoſe his Species, his Country, his Friends, or his Family, to any preſent or future Miſery. Nay every Wiſe Man will; for the All-wiſe Author of Nature has ſo ordered it, he has indued us with ſuch Paſſions and Affections, that no ſolid private Happineſs can be obtained but by ſuch a Behaviour. And every Wiſe Man will expoſe himſelf to preſent private Miſery and Pain, if he finds he may thereby obtain a greater or a more laſting future private Good. In all ſuch Caſes I ſhall readily grant, that our Judgment or Determination is neceſſary; and therefore we do not ſay, nor can properly ſay, I will think or judge ſuch an Action to be Right, or I will not think or judge ſuch an Action to be wrong: With reſpect to the Right or Wrong, Good or Evil, of an Action, our Will has no more to do, than it has with reſpect to the Truth or Falſhood of a Fact or of a Propoſition in *Euclid:* But after we have paſſed Judgment, with reſpect to the Right or Wrong, Good or Evil, of an Action, our Will or Choice, with reſpect to the performing or not performing of that Action, does not neceſſarily follow our Judgment; for in ſpight of our Judgment or Determination,

tion, we may Will, and too often do Will, to prefer our own private Good to the Publick; we too often do Will not to expoſe ourſelves to a ſhort Miſery or Pain, for the Sake of any future Good, however great, however laſting; and we too often do Will, not to refuſe or abſtain from a ſhort and inſignificant preſent Pleaſure, though we are, at that very Time convinced, that our embracing it will be attended with the moſt terrible Conſequences. Nay this we often, even openly, confeſs, at the very Time we are catching at the alluring Bait, and yet we neither deny, nor can deny that Mankind is really a ſenſible Being. This we know by woful, by daily Experience; and every Man perceives he has at all Times a Power both to Will and Act after this wicked or fooliſh Manner; or to Will and Act after a different Manner; therefore we muſt allow that Mr. *Collins* is in a Miſtake, when he ſays, that willing or preferring, is the ſame with reſpect to Good and Evil, that Judging is with reſpect to Truth or Falſhood (*a*); and likewiſe we muſt allow that Man is able at any Time, under the Circumſtances and Cauſes he then is, to do different Things; or in other Words, that he is not unavoidably determined in every

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(*a*) Ibid. P. 39.

Point of Time by the Circumſtances he is in, and Cauſes he is under, to do that one Thing he does, and not poſſibly do any other; and conſequently, that he is a Free-Agent.

Wickedneſs, Fooliſhneſs, Fancy, and Whim explained.

Sect. 22. I ſhall moſt readily grant, that the Will ought to be directed by the laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding; I ſhall grant that it is often ſo; nay, I ſhall grant that it is generally ſo; but that it is neceſſarily ſo, is what we know to be falſe, both from paſt Experience, and from preſent Reflection. We know that we often allow ourſelves to be directed by wrong Motives; Motives which we know to be wrong at the very Time we make choice of them for our Director: Nay, we know that we often both Will and Act without any Motive, or contrary to every Motive publick or private, preſent or future, which communicates to us that Idea we call Fancy or Whim. When a Man allows himſelf to be directed by Motives which are founded upon private Good, in a Caſe where he ought to chuſe to be directed by contrary Motives which are founded upon publick Good, we ſay he acts or behaves wickedly: When a Man allows himſelf to be directed by Motives which are founded upon preſent Good, in a Caſe where he ought to chuſe to be directed by contrary

Motives which are founded upon future Good, we ſay he acts or behaves fooliſhly: But when a Man acts without any Motive, we ſay he acts according to his Fancy; and when he acts contrary to all common Motives, we ſay he is whimſical.

Indifferent Actions examined.

Sect. 23. Having thus ſhewn, that Man is a Free-Agent, with reſpect to thoſe Actions that are directed by Motives founded on the publick or private, preſent or future Good, I think it quite unneceſſary to ſhew that he is a Free-Agent with reſpect to thoſe Actions or Motions that are in themſelves abſolutely indifferent; by which I mean Actions or Motions in the performing or not performing of which, no Good of any Kind can be in the leaſt concerned. In this, it is true, he will generally follow Habit, Cuſtom, or Faſhion; but not neceſſarily; for though a Man uſually makes uſe of his Right Hand, and for that Reaſon, can do many Things with his Right Hand which he cannot do with his Left; yet in all Things he can do with both he may make uſe of either.

Mr. Collin's 2d, Argument anſwered.

Sect. 24. My Author's ſecond Argument for proving Man a neceſſary Agent is, becauſe all his Actions have a Beginning. For, ſays he, “ Whatever has a Beginning, “ muſt have a Cauſe; and every Cauſe is a

" neceſſary Cauſe *(a)*." This is meer metaphyſical Jargon; whatever has a Beginning, muſt, 'tis true, have a Cauſe; but every Cauſe is ſo far from being a neceſſary Cauſe, that no original Cauſe can be a neceſſary Cauſe; and to ſay, that there is no original Cauſe, is begging the Queſtion. I have ſhewn that our Spirit or Soul is of itſelf an active Being, and that it is the original Cauſe of all our voluntary Actions and Motions; and as it is in itſelf Active, and in many Caſes may act which way it pleaſes, therefore it is a Cauſe ſuited to every Effect it does or can produce (*b*).

His 3d, Argument anſwered.

Sect. 25. His third Argument is really a little whimſical: He endeavours to ſhew, that according to all the various Deſcriptions given of Liberty by Theologers and Philoſophers, it would often be an Imperfection, but never a Perfection(*c*). As to the Deſcriptions given of Liberty by Theologers and Philoſophers, I have nothing to do with them, nor ſhall I undertake to ſupport or defend any one of them; and therefore by way of Anſwer to this Argument I ſhall only obſerve, that if Omnipotence be a Perfection, and no Man will deny that it is, the nearer any Being approaches to Omnipotence,

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(a) Ibid. P. 52. *(b)* See before Chap. v. Sect. 5. Chap. x. Sect. 6. *(c)* Mr. *Collins*'s Treatiſe, P. 56.

potence, the more perfect that Being muſt be. Therefore a Being that has a Power to Will Evil, knowing it to be Evil, muſt be more Perfect than a Being that has no Power to Will Evil; that is to ſay, a Being that has no Will at all; for I have ſhewn, that a Being that has no Power to Will Evil, knowing it to be Evil, can have no Will at all, and therefore can no more Will Good than it can Will Evil (*a*). The Imperfection of Man does not therefore conſiſt in his having a Power to Will Evil, knowing it to be Evil, but in his actually Willing Evil, which moſt of us too often do, and thereby often render ourſelves more Miſerable, though not ſo imperfect as a Stock or a Stone. By our having a Power to chuſe Evil as Evil, we are very far from being like Infants that cannot Walk, left to go alone with Liberty to fall; for ſuch Children have no Liberty to fall, they muſt fall, if they cannot Walk. Whereas we can Walk, we may chuſe or Will to avoid the Evil, and therefore need not fall unleſs we are negligent, or reſolved to fall.

His 4th, Argument referred to Divines.

Sect. 26. His fourth Argument (*b*) taken from the Conſideration of the Divine Preſcience, might be eaſily anſwered from the

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(*a*) See before Sect. 17, and 20.

(*b*) Mr. *Collins*'s Treatiſe, P. 71.

Principles of true Religion and Philoſophy; but as this is the Buſineſs of Divines, I ſhall for the preſent at leaſt, leave it to be anſwered by them.

His 5th Argument anſwered.

Sect. 27. His 5th Argument is likewiſe a little whimſical, though it muſt be confeſſed he has made a very good uſe of it. "If "Man," ſays he, "was not a neceſſary "Agent, determined by Pleaſure and Pain, "there would be no Foundation for Re"wards and Puniſhments, which are the eſ"ſential Supports of Society *(a)*." As I have allowed, and as it is certain, that we are, in moſt of our Actions, generally, tho' not neceſſarily, directed by Motives of a publick or private, a preſent or future Nature; therefore Temporal Rewards and Puniſhments are neceſſary, and are the eſſential, though not the only eſſential Supports of Society, in the one Caſe as well as the other. I ſay that Temporal Rewards and Puniſhments are not the only eſſential Supports of Society; for from our own Nature, from thoſe Paſſions and Affections which God has indued us with, eſpecially when ſtrengthened by a good Education, or not weakened by a bad one, we have, in all the important Actions of our Lives, ſtrong Motives from our own Nature, for preferring the publick Good to our own private Good; but as the publick Good that is to enſue from the performing or avoiding any Action, is generally not ſo evident, or more remote than the private Good which is to enſue; therefore it becomes neceſſary for Society, to add the artificial Motives of Temporal Rewards and Puniſhments to thoſe natural Motives that are of the ſide of publick Good, in order to ballance or out-weigh thoſe more evident, or leſs remote natural Motives that are of the ſide of private Good. But when thoſe natural Paſſions and Affections which incite us to purſue the publick or future Good, are weakened by a bad Government, or a bad Education, Hiſtory may ſhew us, how ineffectual Temporal Rewards and Puniſhments prove, for reſtraining Vice or promoting Virtue.

(a) Ibid. P. 75.

His 6th Argument anſwered.

Sect. 28. My Author's ſixth and laſt Argument (*a*) is founded upon a falſe Notion of Morality or Virtue, as every one muſt ſee from what I have ſaid of Virtue and Wiſdom(*b*); and therefore I need only add, that if the Will were neceſſarily determined by the laſt Judgment of the Underſtanding, there could be no ſuch Thing as Immorality or Morality. A Man might in that Caſe be in a Miſtake, but never in a Fault; for when a Man commits a Crime through Miſtake, by ſuppoſing it to be a good and laudable Action, we may ſay he is in an Error,

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(*a*) Ibid. P. 77. (*b*) See before Sect. 19.

Error, but we cannot properly ſay he is in a Fault, or that he is an immoral Man. We never ſay ſo, but when we ſuppoſe that he willed or choſe to do Evil, knowing it to be Evil.

Our Liberty with Regard to Thinking, explained.

Sect. 29. I hope I have now demonſtrated, that, with reſpect to our voluntary Actions or Motions we are Free-Agents; and with regard to our Thoughts, I muſt obſerve, that the perceptive Faculty of the Mind is meerly a paſſive Power or Quality: We can perceive no natural Idea till it be communicated to us by Senſation or Reflection; and we can form no artificial Idea till we have received ſeveral natural Ideas. With regard therefore to the Perception of Ideas, the Mind muſt neceſſarily receive thoſe Impreſſions that are made upon it; but as I have alreadily ſhewn that ſimple Perception is not what we call Thought or Thinking, therefore we cannot from thence conclude, that our Thoughts are neceſſary. Thinking or Thought always conſiſts in the Exerciſe of at leaſt two of the Faculties of the Mind. It always means at leaſt Perceiving and Contemplating; generally it means at leaſt, Perceiving, Contemplating and Comparing (*a*); therefore, to determine whether our Thoughts are free, we muſt examine into the Nature of our Faculties

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(*a*) Chap. vii. Sect. 6.

called Contemplating and Comparing. With regard to Contemplating, though ſome Ideas ſtrike us ſo ſtrongly, that we can hardly avoid Contemplating them for ſome Time, yet we find we are generally at Liberty to Contemplate or not to Contemplate, any Idea or Ideas we have perceived and retained, or which of them we will. We are not only at Liberty to Contemplate an Idea, or ſet of Ideas, when we receive it; but we may recollect any Idea or Ideas we have ſometime before received and retained, and may Contemplate them afreſh. And with regard to Comparing, though it may ſometimes be difficult to turn our Thoughts from one Subject to another, yet even in the moſt difficult Caſes, we find, that after a little ſtruggle, we are always at Liberty to compare any two or more Ideas we will. We may, if we will, compare any two or more Ideas upon their firſt Reception into the Mind; or, we may recollect and compare any two or more Ideas we pleaſe to cull out of that vaſt Magazine we have in our Memory. Therefore, what we properly call our Thoughts or Thinking, may generally, if not always be ſaid to be free. We may Think of any Subject we pleaſe, and as long as we pleaſe, at leaſt as long as we can keep awake; and we may at any Time we pleaſe turn our Thoughts from one Subject to any other Subject we pleaſe to conſider of at that particular Time. In this likewiſe we may be determined by Motives; but by thoſe Motives we are not neceſſarily determined. For thoſe Motives are not the Cauſe of our Thinking, or of our Thinking upon one particular Subject, and not upon any other. It is our Spirit or Soul that is the Cauſe of our Thoughts as well as Actions or Motions; and the Motives are only the Reaſons that prevail with our Spirit or Soul to turn its Thoughts to that particular Subject at that Time.

Moral Certainty explained.

Sect. 30. Having thus ſhewn, that with reſpect to our Motions, Actions, and Thoughts, at leaſt ſuch of them as are voluntary, we are at full Liberty, in the moſt proper Senſe in which the Word can be taken: Having ſhewn, that with reſpect to all ſuch Motions, Actions, and Thoughts, we are under no Neceſſity in any Senſe in which the Word can be taken, I muſt obſerve, that the more perfect a Man's Underſtanding is, the more Wiſdom and Penetration he has, the more conſtantly and the more certainly, though not the more neceſſarily, will he be directed by the moſt preferrable Motives. The more conſtantly and the more certainly will he prefer being directed by thoſe Motives that are founded in the publick Good, to his being directed by thoſe Motives that are founded in his own private Good. The more conſtantly and the more certainly will he prefer being directed by thoſe Motives that are founded in a great or laſting future Good, publick or private, to his being directed by thoſe Motives that are founded in a trifling or tranſitory preſent Good, publick or private. And the more certainly and the more conſtantly will he chuſe to ſubmit to a trifling or tranſitory Evil, publick or private, rather than ſubject himſelf, or run the Hazard of ſubjecting himſelf, to a great or laſting future Evil, publick or private. This is what we properly call Moral Certainty; and as we are not ſo nice as we ſhould be in expreſſing ourſelves upon Philoſophical, Religious, or Moral Subjects, we often call it Moral Neceſſity, which, if Neceſſity be taken in a proper and ſtrict Senſe, is a ridiculous Expreſſion; becauſe, though a Wiſe Man will certainly prefer or will the greateſt Good, yet he does not neceſſarily do ſo, he has it in his Power, upon all occaſions when left to himſelf, to prefer or will the leaſt Good or the greateſt Evil. According to that Emphatick Expreſſion of MILTON, he may with the Devil ſay, *Evil be thou my Good.* This I am affraid is too often the Conſequence of a Man's arguing himſelf, by an improper uſe of Terms, into a Materialiſt, Fataliſt, or Neceſſitarian, which are but different Terms for what is properly called an *Atheiſt.*

Serious Advice to Philoſophers.

Sect. 31. And now I ſhall conclude this Eſſay, with a ſerious Advice to all Philoſophers, and Pretenders to Philoſophy; that with regard to material Subſtances, they would content themſelves with that Knowledge, which is, or may be communicated to them by Senſation improved by Experiment; for it is impoſſible for them, to acquire any Knowledge of a material Object by any other Method. And that, as to ſpiritual Subſtances, they would content themſelves with that Knowledge which is, or may be communicated, by reflecting upon the Qualities and Operations of their own Minds. By this Means they may, nay they muſt, as ſoon as they reflect ſeriouſly upon what they feel within, acquire the Knowledge of a ſpiritual Subſtance; and this Knowledge they may improve, by obſerving the various Effects that are produced in Nature, and the Actions and Motions of other Animals. They may from thence diſcover, that every Animal Syſtem muſt be governed by a Spirit that is indued with ſome one or more of thoſe Qualities, with which they find, by Reflection, their own Spirits indued; and they muſt diſcover, that the whole Syſtem of Nature muſt have been at firſt Created, and muſt be ſtill governed, by a Spirit which has, to an infinite and incomprehenſible Degree, all thoſe Perfections they find, by Reflection, their own Spirits indued with. As this Supreme and Over-ruling Spirit governs himſelf by certain eſtabliſhed Rules or Laws, we may by Obſervation and Experiment diſcover and trace thoſe Laws as far as we can, but it is ridiculous in us to form or lay down any Hypotheſis that is not founded upon, and ſupported by Experiment and Obſervation; and as our Underſtandings are finite, and even extremely narrow, it is Preſumption in us, to pretend to account or give a Reaſon for what appears to be a Law of Nature. So far as we can comprehend, we may diſcover Wiſdom and Deſign in every Part of the Creation; and where we cannot account for, or comprehend, we ought to ſay, with as great a Genius, as ever appeared in any Age or Country.

All Nature is but Art, unknown to Thee,
All Chance, Direction, which thou can'ſt not ſee;
All Diſcord, Harmony not underſtood;
All partial Evil, univerſal Good:
And ſpight of Pride, in erring Reaſon's Spight,
One Truth is clear; "Whatever *Is*, is RIGHT."

POPE's *Eſſay on Man.*

F I N I S.